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Reasonable Suspicion and Mere
Hunches
Craig S. Lerner

59 Vand. L. Rev. 407 (2006)

In Terry v. Ohio, Earl Warren held that police officers could
temporarily detain a suspect, provided that they relied upon
"specific, reasonable inferences," and not simply upon an "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' Since Terry, courts
have strained to distinguish "reasonablesuspicion," which is said to
arise from the cool analysis of objective and particularized facts,
from "mere hunches," which are said to be subjective, generalized,
unreasoned and therefore unreliable. Yet this dichotomy between
facts and intuitions is built on sand. Emotions and intuitions are
not obstacles to reason, but indispensable heuristic devices that
allow people to process diffuse, complex information about their
environment and make sense of the world. The legal rules governing
police conduct are thus premised on a mistaken assumption about
human cognition.
This Article argues that the legal system can defer, to some
extent, to police officers' intuitions without undermining meaningful
protections against law enforcement overreaching. As a practical
matter, the current legal regime substitutes palliative euphemisms
for useful controls on police discretion. It forces police officers to
prune what they say at suppression hearings, but it does little to
change how they act on the streets of America. When an energetic
police officer has a hunch that evil is stirring and action is
imperative, the officer will simply act. Months will pass before a
suppression hearing, and by then it will be a simple matter to
reverse-engineer the objective "reasons"for the stop - e.g., "I saw a
bulge," or "He made a furtive gesture." The legal system in practice
rewards those officers who are able and willing to spin their
behavior in a way that satisfies judges, while it penalizes other
officers who are less verbally facile or who are transparent about
their motivations. Politically accountable authorities should join the
courts in monitoring police practices. And the focus should be less

on what police say after the fact and more on what they do - that is,
how successful police officers are in detecting criminals relative to
the number of stops they make and how respectful officers are of all
citizens.
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INTRODUCTION

In the years immediately preceding the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, "hunches," and the police officers who dared to act
Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. The author thanks Albert
Alschuler, Frank Buckley, Renee Lettow Lerner, Daniel Polsby, and Nancy Tardy for providing
helpful comments. Judges Harold Baer, Douglas Ginsburg, and James Rosenbaum were
unpersuaded by the Article, but graciously offered criticisms.
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upon them, were regularly abused in the popular press, courts, and
legislatures of America. What was a hunch, after all, but a prejudice,
a stereotype, a relic of a benighted past laden with intolerance and
bigotry? Then, planes crashed into the World Trade Center Towers,
the Pentagon, and a Pennsylvania field, and Americans promptly
hectored law enforcement and foreign intelligence officials for their
alleged failures. The criticisms were partially deserved; but in fairness
to the FBI, which bore the brunt of the criticism, much of the
responsibility could be assigned to the legal regime, designed by
Congress and the courts, in which law enforcement operated. 1 As
stories emerged that Americans scattered across the country had
inklings that evil was stirring but failed to take action, countless
commentators expressed indignation at legal rules that were viewed
as preventing or discouraging police officers and citizens from acting
2
upon their hunches.
Although hunches have made something of a comeback since
September 11, 2001, they still generate cognitive dissonance.
Consider a recent press release from the Austin, Texas police
department entitled, "Terrorism: What the Citizen Can Do." Initially,
the police department encourages citizens to take an active part in
terrorism prevention by listening to their hunches:
In all aspects of crime prevention it is important to understand your own survival
signals. Often crime prevention professionals refer to your "gut feelings," this in fact

1.
See generally Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV.
951 (2003) (arguing that the contemporary judicial understanding of probable cause frustrated
the investigation of the man once called the "20 th hijacker," Zacarias Moussaoui); Craig S.
Lerner, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Gathering and
Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 493 (2003) (arguing that the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act had been interpreted to prevent reasonable cooperation between foreign
intelligence agents and law enforcement officers).
2.
In 2001, a clever FBI Agent in Phoenix named Kenneth Williams focused his attention
on ten foreign students who were studying aviation in the Phoenix area. Although the direct
evidence was sketchy, Williams suspected that the men were tied to a radical Islamic group, and
he relayed his inspired hunch to FBI headquarters: Why not canvass other flight training schools
in the United States for possible terrorist ties? Mitch Frank, Four Dots American Intelligence
Failed to Connect, TIME, Apr. 26, 2004, at 30. Two thousand miles away, in Minneapolis, a flight
training instructor had a bad feeling about a Moroccan student named Zacarias Moussaoui. FBI
Agent Colleen Rowley soon shared the flight teacher's misgivings about Moussaoui, and she
requested that FBI headquarters approve a warrant application with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. FBI Supervisor David Frasca ignored Williams's advice and rejected
Rowley's proposed warrant application. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, supra
note 1, at 958-61. A few weeks later, on the morning of September 11, 2001, a U.S. Airways
ticket agent in Boston's Logan Airport had a hunch about two men. "I said to myself, 'If this guy
doesn't look like an Arab terrorist, then nothing does."' But the agent recoiled from the very
thought that had come, unwanted, to his mind: 'Then I gave myself a mental slap, because in
this day and age, it's not nice to say things like this." Michael Smerconish, Screener Pushed
Aside Suspicions on Sept. 11, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at 5.
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is... one of the messengers of your intuition. The root meaning of intuition is "to
guard, to protect," and can serve as an invaluable tool. Call it what you want- that
nagging feeling, persistent
thoughts, hunch or suspicion. It is important not to ignore
3
your survival signals.

As for what should alert those "survival signals," the press release
hovers at a level of inoffensive and unintelligible abstraction: "Be
aware of conspicuous or unusual behavior ... Are you suspicious
about your tenants? '4 What does this concretely mean? Especially
given the widely reported fact that the 9/11 terrorists were Arab men
renting apartments in American cities, 5 one might infer that the press
release condones a landlord's sensitivity to racial and ethnic
variations in terrorist proclivities. But lest this conclusion be drawn,
the press release concludes with a bracing section on "hate crimes,"
defined capaciously to include "intolerance and bigotry intended to
hurt and intimidate someone [on the basis] of ... race, ethnicity,
national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. '6
The
citizens of Austin are first encouraged to take seriously their snap
judgments about possible threats, which might well arise from racial
or ethnic stereotypes, and then cautioned against bigotry and
reminded of the dangers of rushing too quickly to judgment, especially
on the basis of racial or ethnic stereotypes.
This confusion is spun out for two hundred bestselling pages in
Malcolm Gladwell's new book, Blink. On his website, Gladwell touts
the book as an exploration of the "two seconds [in which we] jump to a
series of conclusions," and posits that "those instant conclusions that
we reach are really powerful and really important and, occasionally,
really good." 7 Oddly, the genesis of the book was when Gladwell let
his hair grow wild, and was treated differently, especially by the
police, who drew erroneous conclusions from his tousled locks.8 Of one
incident he writes, "Something about the first impression created by
my hair derailed every other consideration in the hunt for the rapist."9
Gladwell seems bewildered and dismayed that police officers might
instinctively react differently to one person in a crew cut and another
in dreadlocks. The lesson of Gladwell's numbing barrage of anecdotes
is something along the lines of: Hunches are good; except when they

3.
Austin Police Department, Terrorism: What the Citizen Can Do, http://www.ci.austin.
tx.us/policecl-terrorism.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter What the Citizen Can Do].
4.
Id.
5.
See Frank, supra note 2, at 30.
6.
See What the Citizen Can Do, supra note 3.
7.
Gladwell.com, http://www.gladwell.com/blink/index.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
8.
MALcoLM GLADWELL, BLINK 263-64 (2005).
9.
Id. at 263.
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are bad. Generally, they are bad when they conform to gender or
racial or other stereotypes. 10
Of course, it's easy to be a critic, and I have rambled for several
paragraphs about hunches without defining them. I've trusted that
the reader has a sense of what I mean: we've all had hunches, and
sometimes they prove valuable and sometimes not. However often
hunches have failed us, I suspect that we all still flatter ourselves, as
Thomas Hobbes might say, that we're especially talented in this
regard.1
When the word "hunch" is used in common discourse, several
somewhat related and somewhat contradictory aspects are involved.
First, a "hunch" is formed quickly. The German cognitive psychologist
Gerd Gigerenzer coined the term "fast and frugal heuristics" to
describe the way the human mind operates under real world
conditions of "bounded rationality," where information is sparse and
time is limited.1 2 Such conditions are generally understood to prevent
optimal thinking, which is said to reflect the methodical incorporation
of all possible variables in a complex algorithm.
Gigerenzer's
provocative claim is not simply that the "fast and frugal heuristic" is
an alternative way of thinking but that it is often preferable: one can
generate better results by stripping out many variables and acting
13
quickly and on less information.
Gigerenzer offers the following illustration.1 4 When a patient
with chest pains is rushed into a hospital, doctors need to make
judgments about the proper course of action. One model would
require them to take dozens of measurements, tabulate the results,
and then crunch it all through a "fancy statistical software package."
Emergency room doctors in a Chicago hospital perfected an
alternative strategy, classifying possible heart attack patients as lowrisk or high-risk on the basis of three simple yes-or-no questions (for
example, whether the patient was older than 62.5 years). According to
Gigerenzer, doctors achieved greater accuracy with the second
method, even though it ignores much potentially relevant information,
10. For a criticism of Gladwell, see Richard A. Posner, Blinkered, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan.
24, 2005.
11. Cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 75 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Pub. Co. Inc. 1994)
(1651) ("[Sluch is the nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be
more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise
as themselves.").
12.

See generally GERD GIGERENZER & PETER M. TODD, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US

SMART (1999).
13. See id. at 5.
14. Id. at 3-5 (drawing an example from L. BREIMAN & J. H. OLSHEN, CLASSIFICATION AND
REGRESSION TREES (1993)).
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such as the sex of the patient; and even though, with respect to the
categories of information deemed relevant, such as age, it relies
exclusively on a binary switch (greater or less than 62.5 years), and
thus ignores the relevance of gradations. Among other explanations,
human beings seem to be distracted by an excess of information: they
are prone to focus on irrelevancies or overstate the significance of
marginally relevant data. The key to success, according to Gigerenzer,
is the formulation of "simple heuristics that make us smart."
A second aspect to "hunches" is that they reflect a manner of
thinking that may not be easily or persuasively conveyed in words. It
is generally assumed that a skilled craftsman can respond to a
problem almost without conscious thought, by drawing upon his vast
recollection of previous experience; by contrast, a beginner has to work
slowly through each of the steps of the puzzle. Recent neurological
studies of chess players demonstrate that when grandmasters and
ordinary chess players are presented with a game position and asked
to memorize the placement of the pieces, the former group can tap into
their vast memory of games played and simply "recognize" the key
elements to the situation, whereas the latter need to expend far
greater mental energy to accomplish the task. 15 As the Hungarian
scientist Michael Polanyi has noted, "we know more than we can
tell,"'16 and precisely as we become more expert at a task, our
knowledge becomes ever more "tacit" or inarticulable. If called upon
to explain our actions, we find it difficult to do so, for the knowledge is
so deeply hard-wired that it is not easily summoned and articulated.
Experts do not resort to first principles and consciously run through a
series of logical steps. Rather, Polanyi argues, they rely on their
experience and instinct; they have a sense about what seems right and
what feels wrong.
Finally, "hunches" are experienced more as an emotion than as
an application of reason. They are instinctive responses that are felt
more than they are thought. Although we moderns tend to exalt cool,
methodical thought, older political philosophers such as Edmund
Burke and James Fitzjames Stephen insisted on the value of
emotional responses. A latter-day exponent of this view is Leon Kass,
chair of the Presidential Council of Bioethics, who has argued that,
apart from any cost-benefit analysis, we experience feelings of disgust
15. Magnetocephalographic studies of the brains of grandmasters and those of amateurs,
when playing games against computers, provide hard evidence that the grandmasters really do
use a different part of the brain. Ognjen Amidzic et al., Patterns of Focal [Gamma]-Bursts in
Chess Players,412 NATURE 603 (2001).
16. See generally MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (1964); MICHAEL POLANYI, TACIT DIMENSION (2d ed. 1983).
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towards certain scientific advances, and that these feelings convey
genuine information:
We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not because of the strangeness
or novelty of the undertaking, but because we intuit and feel, immediately and without
argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear. Repugnance, here as
elsewhere, revolts against the excesses of human willfulness, warning us not to
transgress against what is unspeakably profound. 17

On a more prosaic level, each of us has experienced negative feelings
toward a person or speaker, and we often assume those feelings are
cues that assist us in detecting deception. We have a hunch, based on
demeanor evidence-altogether apart from the actual content of what
18
the person is saying-that the person is a liar.
In Blink, Gladwell offers an anecdote to illustrate "tacit
knowledge" and emotional responses triumphing in a battle with
articulable and analytical thinking. 19 In 1983, the Getty Museum in
California was presented with an opportunity to purchase a marble
statue, purportedly dating to the sixth-century BC. The Getty hired a
geologist, who spent months conducting various analyses before
concluding that the statute was authentic. He even proudly published
his findings in Scientific American. In the week that the sale was
finalized, however, three experts in antiquities viewed the statue and
each reacted negatively. Their responses were more emotional than
reasoned. They simply said, in various ways, that the statute "didn't
look right." The Getty, relying upon the scientists and lawyers (who
had sifted through the documentary record), went through with the
purchase.
But within months, the hunches of the experts were
vindicated: the statute was revealed to be a forgery.
How does the current legal system deal with hunches? It
depends on whose hunch it is. Judges respect their own hunches.
However much they may condemn hunches in others, especially police
officers, judges regard themselves as the possessors of intuitive
powers-to discern which side has the better argument on the basis of
their long experience, their "feel" of a case, or the demeanor of a
witness. The legal system is premised, in part, on the idea that the
trial judge (and jury), who actually see the witness and size him up,
17. LEON KASS, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 3, 19
(1998).
18. Whether we really can, through facial or demeanor evidence, detect deception is hotly
debated. The psychologist Paul Ekman is the most distinguished exponent of the view that at
least certain people are capable of detecting deception based on facial cues. See Paul Ekman,
Maureen O'Sullivan & Mark G. Frank, A Few Can Catch a Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCi. 263, 263
(1999). For a more skeptical review of the literature on the ability to detect deception from facial
cues, see Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1078-91 (1991).
19. The following example is found in GLADWELL, supra note 8, at 3-8, 14.
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enjoy a privileged fact-finding position entitled to substantial
20
deference.
Judges, however, are more skeptical when others claim to act
upon the basis of hunches.
In this respect, although Gladwell
criticizes the Getty Museum's decision to purchase the Greek statue,
one must sympathize with its board of directors given the legal regime
in which they operate. Imagine that a corporation is given a timesensitive opportunity to purchase a small competitor; the executives
are certain, based on their intuition, that the offered price is fair and
that the deal will be profitable. Should the board approve the deal?
The legal regime of corporate law aspires to ensure that it does not. It
encourages the corporation to engage in precisely the kind of
systematic and costly due diligence that proved worthless for the
Getty Museum. 2 1 Likewise, should doctors acquire less information,
rather than more, when treating a patient? Again, the law penalizes
doctors who adopt a "fast and frugal heuristic," while rewarding
doctors-in terms of decreased legal exposure-who methodically
document reams of marginally relevant or even useless data. All this
said, courts recognize that corporate executives and doctors should be
afforded a substantial scope for their intuitive expertise and have
crafted various doctrines that accord some deference to their
22
hunches.
What about police officers?
Police officers, like corporate
executives, doctors, and even judges, get better at what they do with
time; and part of what is meant by "get better" is that they develop a
sense of what is right without recourse to first principles. Among
themselves and in informal discussions with others, police officers
insist that their hunches about criminals are often right and that their
"sixth sense" proves invaluable in the field. Nevertheless, when police
officers testify during a suppression hearing, they almost never use
the word "hunch" or any of its variants ("sixth sense," "gut instinct,"
etc.); the entire language of intuitive thinking is excised from their

20. See infra Part III.C (discussing the deferential standard of review accorded factual
determinations made by judges and juries).
21. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board of
directors had violated its duty of care in arranging for the sale of the company, despite the fact
that the board had secured a 45% premium on the current market price because it had failed to
do what the court deemed adequate due diligence). But see id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting)
('These men [on the board of directors] knew Trans Union like the back of their hands and were
more than well qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the affairs
of Trans Union including a 100% sale of the corporation.").
22. For example, the business judgment rule largely insulates boards of directors from
judicial scrutiny, and courts regularly state that doctors must be able to act based on unwritten
guidelines, in accordance with their feel of a patient.
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vocabulary the moment they assume their place in the witness stand.
The police officers seek to curry favor with judges at suppression
hearings by speaking in a carefully pruned discourse, which
emphasizes "objective" criteria that judges have certified as acceptable
in past cases. Police officers can hardly be faulted for crafting their
testimony in this manner because the judicial system is unrelentingly
hostile to their hunches.
Imagine that it is closing time at a bar known to attract some
rough customers. A police car arrives at the scene, and the officers see
a man run behind the bar. The officers decide to investigate, and they
see three men milling about, including the one who fled moments
before. One of the officers feels that something is wrong with the
scene; in an instant, he realizes that the man is holding a beer bottle
in his left hand, which is unusual given the fact that most people are
right-handed. The officer testifies about the suspect:
[H]is whole attitude, although he was calm, he seemed a little bit almost cocky. But he
acted as though I was
looked at me, we made eye contact, but then he looked away and
23
not there and tried to walk on by. And that caught my attention.

Does the officer have the authority to stop and frisk him?
Such were the facts of United States v. Michelletti,24 and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, split
almost exactly down the middle. At a suppression hearing, Officer
George Perry did his best to manufacture "objective" justifications for
the stop and frisk (the bar, the hour, the beer bottle in the left hand,
the direction in which the suspect was walking), but the judges
spotted the case for what it was: a police officer had a hunch that a
man had a gun and instinctively stopped him; after the fact, he
concocted various "reasons" for the stop. For all we know, Perry is the
most exceptional police officer in Houston, and his hunches have
proven flawless. (He was right this time.) In the eyes of the judicial
system, however, the evidence provided by the officer during the
suppression hearing must be of a particular kind: "objective,"
"particularized," and "articulable." Should a police officer ever admit
the truth-that he had a subjective, inchoate, and inarticulable
hunch-the court would rain down abuse on the poor fellow and recite
25
a lecture on the importance of civil liberties.
26
Ever since the 1968 Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio,
police officers have understood the importance of fashioning their

23.
24.
25.
26.

United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 840 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Id.
See infra Part II.B.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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testimony at a suppression hearing in a way that satisfies the judicial
fetish for neatly packaged "reasonable articulable suspicion." Yet the
case law that has emerged since Terry is a hopeless clutter, the
inevitable result of the Court's untenable distinction between
reasonable suspicion, which is said to arise from the cool analysis of
objective and particularized evidence, and mere hunches, which are
said to be subjective, generalized, unreasoned and therefore
unreliable. The distinction breaks down almost immediately. Is the
fact that a suspect seems nervous to a police officer an objective piece
of evidence or a subjective one? Is the fact that a suspect is found in a
high-crime area particularized evidence or general evidence?
It
should not be surprising that the cases are all over the map on these
and dozens of similar questions.
At bottom, the current Terry regime rests on our unwillingness
to trust police officers to act upon their hunches because, if we did,
they would have boundless discretion. The problem, however, is not
with boundless discretion in and of itself, but with the possibility that
the discretion will be abused-that police will unreasonably stop and
frisk people. So the operative question becomes: Does the current
system meaningfully restrict police officers' ability to act
unreasonably? I am doubtful. To a great extent, the current legal
regime merely substitutes palliative euphemisms for useful controls
on a police officer's discretion.
If an energetic police officer has a powerful hunch that criminal
activity is afoot, he will take action, long before he has tabulated the
reasons in his mind, certified that they are "objective," and satisfied
himself that there are not innocent explanations for each of the
constituent pieces of evidence mitigating the force of his hunch. The
officer will simply act, in accordance with the dictates of a "fast and
frugal" heuristic, and hope that he will be able to reverse-engineer the
"reasons" after the fact. Less energetic, and perhaps more typical,
police officers already feel overwhelmed by conflicting bureaucratic
pressures, altogether apart from the temporally distant possibility of a
judicial rebuke at a suppression hearing. 27 The following must be the

27. There are many internet blogs written by police officers, current and former, that
portray the hazards of a cop's life, some of which arise from their supervisors' conflicting
expectations. Cops must walk an undefined and razor-thin line between aggressive and lazy.
Consider the following musing from a rookie police officer:
Every 6 months at our department evaluations of our work are done by the supervisor
assigned to evaluate us.... Lt. Nutjob who no less then 2 months ago told me I was
being too aggressive and needed to lay off, tells me last night I'm performing poorly
because my citation number has dropped off, and I'm not actively searching for
crime.... If I don't change that in 6 months, it's grounds for termination. Let's break
this down, shall we?

416
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inner monologue of many a police officer when he spots a criminal:
"That guy looks fishy to me, but do I really want to stop him? First of
all, he might shoot me-that wouldn't be good. Second, what do I care
if he's a gang banger; I don't live here. Third, if I stop him and he
28
turns out to be carrying drugs, I'll have to fill out an incident report.
And finally, if I'm proven right, I'll get a lecture from a judge that all I
had was a hunch, and a mere hunch at that. Fine, I'll stay right
here."

29

What if the courts, especially in the federal system, retreated
from their micro-management of police forces across America? What
if, furthermore, we abandoned the current euphemism-laden system
and adopted, in effect, something closer to a statistical, quality control
regime? 30 If a cop working drug interdiction stops one hundred people,
and in ninety instances a drug-sniffing dog alerts, and the suspect
turns out to be a drug dealer, how could it be said that the officer was
acting unreasonably regardless of what reasons he gives after the fact?
1. I am too aggressive. I need to stop running so much traffic, and give less citations.
2. I haven't been giving enough citations and I'm not actively searching for crimes in
progress.
3. Despite my probation period of 1 year being up, a mark of unsatisfactory on my
evaluation by a raving manic depressive moron is going to get me fired in 6 months.
That's a head-scratcher, isn't it? I'm not allowed to do my job to the best of my
abilities, then I'm going to be punished for not doing my job to the best of my abilities.
Anonymous Posting, http://unittwentytwo.blogspot.com/2005/11/employee-evaluation-time.html
(on file with the author). One anonymous police officer commented on this post: "Police work is
full of worthless supervisors. Try this. Look around you and pick out the stupidest, most
worthless suck-up among your peers. Write his or her name down on a piece of paper. Write
"Sgt" in front of their name. Wait two years." A pseudonymous author for National Review
Online recounts his day-to-day struggles, not only with criminals, but also with superviors, as a
uniformed police officer in Los Angeles. See National Review Online, Archive of Jack Dunphy,
http://www.nationalreview.com/dunphy/dunphy-archive.asp
(last visited Mar. 31, 2006)
(archiving Dunphy's articles over the past three years). For an amusing account of this officer's
impressions of police brass, see Jack Dunphy, Choosing the Next Chief, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Aug.
21, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/dunphy/dunphy082102.asp ("I get close enough to see
those telltale signs, the all but vanished yet unmistakable scars from the surgeries: the ones in
which their spines were removed.").
28. Irritation at paperwork, especially when it spills over the end of a shift, is a recurring
complaint among police officers. See SUE BARTON, UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIES OF POLICING 39-

40 (2004), availableat http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/police/downloads/unlock.pdf (depicting a day in
the life of a police officer as seen by the officer himself. Predictably, the day ends: "Now just
thirty minutes before I go 10-42 [ending tour of duty], I get a burglary call ...as usual, I will
have to work late to finish up writing up the report.").
29. In general, the problem of police laziness is given little attention by law professors,
especially when contrasted with the problem of overly aggressive policing. On December 2, 2005,
a Westlaw search of "police brutality" in the TP-ALL database revealed 2,614 hits; a search of
police /2 laz! managed just 18 hits. Without in any way minimizing the problem of "police
brutality," it would seem incumbent on observers to at least acknowledge the converse problem.
30. See generally W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS (1986) (discussing statistical
quality control).

2006]

REASONABLE SUSPICIONAND MERE HUNCHES

417

Isn't this precisely the kind of cop to be rewarded, promoted, and
praised? Why should such a police officer not be preferred to another
who, in the same time period, stops just ten people for objective,
particularized, and articulable reasons and only two turn out to be
drug dealers? Why did the first police officer act unreasonably and
the second one act reasonably? And more pointedly, why are courts
dictating which method of police regulation is not simply preferable,
but constitutionally required? As Judge Carl McGowan wrote over
thirty years ago:
The judges might say in effect to the police: If you can satisfy us that you are doing
everything you can to reduce the incidence of violations through meaningful disciplinary
action, we will no longer need to seek deterrence through the indirect sanction of
exclusion. This would be a sensible approach, since direct discipline imposed by the
police internally is far more likely to deter than remote exclusions of evidence in
31
criminal trials.

Three years ago, I criticized the trend in modern Supreme
Court opinions to cast "probable cause," which is required under the
Fourth Amendment to issue a warrant, make an arrest, or conduct an
automobile search, as an inflexibly high standard. 32 As I then argued,
even when a search is minimally intrusive or especially imperative,
courts have preserved "probable cause" in all its pristine glory, as a
fixed standard-that is, one that admits of no nuances.3 3 I proposed a
more reasonable approach to probable cause, which factored in the
gravity of the investigated offense and the intrusiveness of the
proposed search. Most simply put, it is unreasonable to demand the
same quantum of proof from police when they propose to search a car
trunk for a kidnapped child as when they propose to ransack a home
34
for a gram of cocaine.
This Article takes issue with the modern Court's approach to
the "reasonable suspicion" standard, which courts require police to
satisfy before they conduct a "stop and frisk." Although nominally
reasonable, the standard in actual practice has failed to deliver on its
promise. In large part this difficulty is born of the unrealistic
dichotomy between reasonable suspicion on the one hand and "mere
hunches" on the other.

31. Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 690 (1972).
32. See generally Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, supra note 1.
33. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (resisting application of a
"multifactor balancing test" of reasonable police conduct under the circumstances and adhering
to the probable cause standard).
34. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting
that he would try harder to sustain searching the trunk of a car for a kidnapped child than he
would to sustain searching a car for bootlegged liquor).
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Bowing to the ruthless dictates of the fourth dimension, the
Article is roughly divided into Past, Present, and Future. Part II,
which sketches the development of rules governing police stops and
frisks, argues that the novelty of Terry v. Ohio is its depreciation of
police hunches and its creation of a distinction between "objective" and
"subjective" evidence. Part III, which focuses on a recent and typical
Terry decision, argues that courts are prone to overstate the value of
"objective" factors and understate the value of "subjective" factors.
Part IV, which notes some costs of the current approach to reasonable
suspicion, suggests that in the future courts give some deference to
police hunches, especially when the privacy intrusion is negligible and
the suspected offense especially grave.

II. TERRY V. OHIO
In terms of regulating police conduct on the streets of America,
Terry v. Ohio is probably the most important Supreme Court decision
in modern criminal procedure. Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion
held that a police officer, even without "probable cause," can stop
someone and ask him questions; and if in the course of doing so the
officer senses possible danger to himself, he can conduct a frisksomething more than a cursory pat-down and more akin to a feeling
with "sensitive fingers" 35 -to be sure that the subject is not armed.
Frisking, in such circumstances, is not an "arrest" for constitutional
purposes and need not be justified by "probable cause." All the officer
requires is "reasonable suspicion," which the Court contrasted with "a
mere hunch."
This Part begins by considering the Terry opinion itself, which
suggests that, unbeknownst to its author, the officer who initiated the
most famous stop and frisk in our nation's history began his
investigation on the basis of nothing more than a mere hunch.
Ironically, the major innovation and lasting impact of the Terry
decision was its disparagement of mere hunches. Although
contemporary critics of Terry have argued that the decision conferred
unprecedented discretion on police officers, the legal regime governing
pre-Terry policing was, in fact, remarkably lenient. Since Terry,
however, the Supreme Court has more comprehensively monitored
police practices and become ever more watchful of anything that
resembles a "hunch." The Court has emphasized the distinction
between an approved category of evidence, which is "objective and

35.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968).

2006]

REASONABLE SUSPICIONAND MERE HUNCHES

419

particularized," and a disapproved category of evidence, which is
subjective and generalized.
A. Officer McFadden'sHunch
Martin McFadden may be the only cop ever cast in a heroic role
in an Earl Warren opinion. A police officer for nearly four decades,
McFadden walked the beat in downtown Cleveland one day in 1963.36
Amidst the pageant of democracy-the parade of bustling citizens,
gawking shoppers, and indolent scoundrels-two individuals caught
McFadden's eye. In Earl Warren's words, "He had never seen the two
men before, and he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye
to them."37
Warren unintentionally makes an important point:
McFadden was suspicious of these two men before there was any
apparent reason for suspicion. And he was proven right. Surely, there
were other socially useless individuals-a pair of law professors,
perhaps-strolling along Euclid Avenue that day. But Terry and
Chilton excited McFadden's curiosity. What was it about these two
men, as opposed to the two professors, that struck him as suspicious?
Warren writes approvingly:
[McFadden] testified that he had been a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35
and that he had been assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for
shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. He explained that he had developed routine
habits of observation over the years and that he would "stand and watch people or walk
and watch people at many intervals of the day." He added: "Now, in this case when I
38
looked over they didn't look right to me at the time."

Why did McFadden follow these fellows? He is "unable to say"; he
simply thought they "didn't look right." Or to put this more directly:
McFadden had a hunch.
Fortunately, McFadden acted upon his hunch. He followed
these two men, and thus witnessed them walk back and forth several
times along a certain block, pausing to look into the same store, and
gather repeatedly in hushed conversation, joined at one point by
another individual. McFadden eventually approached the three men
and asked their names. After receiving "mumbled" answers, he
pushed them into a store and performed the first Terry frisk in our
nation's history.3 9 By the time McFadden actually confronted the
three men, anyone could have gathered that something untoward was
afoot, a fact not lost on Warren: "It would have been poor police work
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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indeed for an officer of thirty years' experience in the detection of
thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to
40
investigate this behavior further."
Warren is generous in his praise of McFadden's police work,
referring to him throughout the opinion as "Officer McFadden." But
the irony is that Warren fails to see the important point lurking in his
own recitation of the facts: "There is nothing unusual in two men
standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone.
Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such circumstances
strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows,
moreover, are made to be looked in." 41 Precisely so, which is why Earl
Warren (or I, or you) would likely never have noticed Terry and
Chilton in the first place: they would have been lost in the crowd.
Seeing nothing suspicious about them, we would have tracked other
individuals, or walked to a different location. By the time, McFadden
had watched Terry and Chilton "hover about a street corner for an
extended period of time ...pausing to stare in the same store window
roughly 24 times," no congratulations are in order to the police officer
who took action. The impressive aspect of the story is McFadden's
suspicions when there was "nothing unusual" about their actions.
Of course, we have no idea how many times McFadden's eyes
were drawn to people who "didn't look right" to him but who were in
fact innocently shopping.
For all we know, the vindication of
McFadden's hunch in this case should be seen against a backdrop of
Inspector Clouseau-like bumbling.
Perhaps the day before
McFadden's triumphant arrest, he had trailed a pair of law professors
around Cleveland, oblivious to the pickpockets and jewel thieves
plying their trade all about him. And this assumes good faith, if
incompetence, on McFadden's part. Perhaps he made a practice of
following African-Americans for no other reason than their race or
bearded young men because of their anti-war patches. But Terry's
own attorney, who subsequently went on to become a member of
Congress, has acknowledged that McFadden was widely regarded as a
good and honest cop, 42 so let us assume for the moment, subject to
revisiting later, 43 that McFadden's hunches served him well, not only

40. Id. at 23.
41. Id. at 22-23.
42. See Louis Stokes, Representing John W. Terry, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 727, 729 (1998)
("He was a real character-a tall, stately guy, and basically a good policeman. 'Mac,' as we called
him, was really a guy that we really liked. He was straight. One thing about him-as a police
officer, he came straight down the line. You did not have to worry about him misrepresenting
what the facts were.").
43. See infra Part JV.D.
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that spring day in 1963, but at other times in his thirty-year career as
well.
Yet when Warren states the rule of law to emerge from Terry,
he
deprecates hunches-never
acknowledging
that without
McFadden's original hunch, there would likely have been no case at
all. Warren writes that an "officer need not be absolutely certain that
the individual is armed" in order to stop and frisk him:
[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight
must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularizedsuspicion or 'hunch,' but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.

44

B. The Disparagementof Hunches
Chief Justice Warren's decision to place the word "hunch" in
quotation marks-a stylistic choice that has since become common
practice in judicial opinions 45-can be interpreted in two ways. First,
Warren may have doubted that hunches provide any meaningful
information and are therefore worthless data; in this respect, Warren
may have adopted the modern view that if you cannot articulate an
opinion and reason it out from objective first principles, it is simply
unreliable. Second, Warren may have accepted the premise that
hunches are not wholly unreliable but may have doubted that the
legal system could be fashioned in a way that gave any credence to a
police officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." My sense is
that Warren's decision to place "hunch" in quotation marks suggests
he is inclined to the first view-that hunches are not really probative
"evidence" at all.
Prior to Terry, courts were receptive to the idea that police
officers, through time and experience, might develop a heightened
ability to detect criminal wrongdoing and that some degree of judicial
deference might be owed these abilities.
For example, a 1963
California state court opinion observed that "[e]xperienced police
officers naturally develop an ability to perceive the unusual and
suspicious which is of enormous value in the difficult task of
protecting the security and safety of law-abiding citizens." 46 Since
Terry, however, Fourth Amendment opinions follow a predictable
44.
45.
reliance
46.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (stating that "an officer's
on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify an investigatory stop").
People v. Cowman, 223 Cal.App.2d 109, 117 (1963).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:2:407

trajectory. An opinion that begins by highlighting how "experienced"
the police officer is will likely culminate in the denial of a motion to
suppress and a defendant dispatched to prison. By contrast, an
opinion that employs the adjective "subjective" when describing the
evidence to justify a stop spells trouble for the state; and if ever the
word "hunch" should grace the pages of the "statement of facts," that
likely means one happy criminal defendant.
"Hunch"47 (and its
4
8
cousins "instinct," "gut feeling,"
and "sixth sense"49) generally
portend the collapse of the prosecution's case.
One can sympathize with police officers lured by defense
attorneys into an admission that they acted on a "hunch." Officer
Heath's fate in State v. Emilo 50 can serve as a cautionary tale for naive
police officers preparing to endure the perils of cross-examination.
While driving home at 3:00 a.m. on a deserted gravel road, Officer
Heath saw a Saab that he did not recognize as belonging to anyone in
the neighborhood. 5 1 Lacking a front license plate, the car piqued his
curiosity, and Officer Heath pulled it over. 52 Alas, the officer's

47. See, e.g., People v. Croft, 805 N.E.2d 1233, 1240 (Ill.
App. 2004) ("In short, Officer Row
had merely a hunch, not the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect a Terry stop."); United
States v. Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1284 (D. Utah 2001) ('Mangelson's detention of defendants
was based upon merely a 'hunch' that criminal activity was afoot."); United States v. Roggeman,
No. CROO-3046, 2001 WL 34008491, at *7 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 28, 2001) ("Trooper Moore was acting
on nothing but a 'hunch' or subjective belief unsupported by objective facts."), rev'd, 279 F.3d 573
(8th Cir. 2002); Bowen v. State, 685 So.2d 942, 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("Crose's testimony
amounts to merely a hunch, which is insufficient to justify an investigatory search."); United
States v. Morris, 910 F.Supp. 1428, 1446 (N.D. Iowa 1995) ("[Tlhe court concludes instead that
Trooper Hindman was acting on nothing but a 'hunch' or subjective belief unsupported by
objective facts."); Rogers v. State, 426 S.E.2d 209, 213 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) ("That [Officer Bunn's]
'hunch' about [appellant] proved correct is perhaps a tribute to his policeman's intuition, but it is
not sufficient to justify, ex post facto, a seizure that was not objectively reasonable at its
inception. Because (the record contains no evidence that [Bunn] had) a reasonable suspicion that
[appellant was] hauling drugs [or weapons], the stop cannot be upheld on that ground." (quoting
Tarwid v. State, 363 S.E.2d 63, 66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987))).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Hyde, No. 1993-65, 1993 WL 733094, at *2 (D. Virgin Is. Oct.
21, 1993) ("Lambert herself articulated that she acted as much on a 'gut feeling' that something
was amiss as on any or all of the factors she recited."), rev'd, 37 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1994).
49. See, e.g., State v. Costa, 742 A.2d 599, 603 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999) ("[The officer]
stated that the manner in which defendant and Priate exited their car set off his 'sixth sense'...
.We conclude that a non-specific 'sixth sense' does not equate with a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot."); United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1994)
("[Officer] Bushnell's testimony regarding his "sixth sense," his detection of a "tension in the air,"
and his belief that something was 'afoot,' strongly suggests he was acting more on an
unparticularized hunch than on reasonable and objective suspicion."); City of Columbus v.
Holland, 601 N.E. 2d 190, 192-93 (Ohio App. 3d 1991) (stating that the "sixth sense" of the
arresting officer does not constitute reasonable suspicion).
50. 479 A.2d 169 (Vt. 1984).
51. Id. at 170.
52. Id.
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premonition that something was amiss turned out to be correct, and
the car thieves tried to flee on foot as soon as the car stopped.5 3 Here,
however, was the cross-examination at the suppression hearing:
Q. [I]t
was basically your belief that no cars should be on Route 66 at that time in the
morning that prompted the stop; is that correct?
A. I felt it was very... unusual ....
Q. But there is nothing in particular about that unusualness that would tie.., this
particular car to any particular crime?
A. No...
Q. So, more or less, it was just a hunch that you had?
A. Well, ifthat's the way you want to put it, yes.

54

The court, of course, cast the defendant free, but not before a
mocking reference to the police officer's "suspicion. ' 55 One wonders if
the prosecutor took Officer Heath aside after the hearing and gave
him a quick lesson in Testifying 101: Never allow a defense attorney to
put words in your mouth. You never pull someone over on just a
hunch. The correct answer, of course, was:
A. Hunch? No, I wouldn't call it that, sir. I would say there were a number of objective
factors which, viewed in their totality through my experienced eyes, rose to the level of
reasonable suspicion.

Likewise, in State v. Thompson, 56 the officer's failure to couch
his testimony in appropriate language (that is, excising any reference
to "hunches") doomed the case. There, a radio dispatcher notified
State Patrol Trooper Jacobson that an occupant of a car traveling
along Interstate 5 had been waving a handgun.5 7 A description and
license plate were reported, and Officer Jacobson must have felt the
stars were aligned when he soon saw that very car whiz by. 58 He
followed the car into a parking lot and watched as it "meandered"
through the lot before stopping near a lone parked car in a deserted
part of the lot. 59 He approached the two cars and observed the driver

53. Id.
54. Id. at 171.
55. Id. ("Here, Officer Heath's 'suspicion' that the Saab did not belong in the particular area
in the early morning hours, without more, clearly falls outside of an 'articulable and reasonable'
suspicion of some criminal wrongdoing.").
56. 601 P.2d 1284 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 613 P.2d 525 (Wash. 1980).
57. Id. at 1285-86.
58. Id. at 1286.
59. Id.
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of the parked car emerge and begin walking quickly away. 60 The
officer stopped him, radioed back for information about the parked
car, and learned within a brief period of time that there was an
outstanding traffic violation. 61 The driver was arrested and searched,
and drugs were found on his person and in the car. 62 Of course, given
the peculiarities of modern American criminal procedure, the decisive
event was the brief stop while the police officer radioed for
information.
If that stop was illegal, then all the subsequently
discovered evidence was the poisonous fruit of an improper stop, and
therefore suppressible. On this point, here was Officer Jacobson's
disastrous testimony:
I had a suspicious circumstance. Call it instinct or whatever. Something told me that I
should keep this gentleman long enough to I.D. him. Call it instinct, intuition, hunch,
sixth sense, or whatever, there was reason for a trained police officer to believe that
63
something untoward was afoot.

The trial court and the appellate court labored to rescue Officer
Jacobson from his own honesty, emphasizing that it was not any
"sixth sense" on his part, but "objective criteria" amounting to
reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. 64 Such a conclusion was quite
defensible. There was probable cause to believe the one car, which the
officer had seen on the highway, contained a person who had been
waving a handgun; when that car stopped immediately next to a
parked car in a nearly empty lot, it surely hinted at a collaborative
undertaking.
The Supreme Court of Washington nonetheless
reversed, stating "this 'inarticulate hunch' is precisely the type of
subjective basis which is constitutionally insufficient, because it
creates a risk that a person may be detained solely at the unfettered
6' 5
discretion of officers in the field.
C. Terry's Civil LibertarianCritics
When it was decided, Terry was celebrated in the academic
community as a compromise position-a happy mean between the
claim (urged by the State of Ohio) that a frisk is not a "search" at all
and therefore outside the Fourth Amendment and the competing
claim (embraced by a dissenting Justice Douglas) that a frisk is a fullfledged constitutional event, governed by the Fourth Amendment's
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1287.
State v. Thompson, 613 P.2d 525, 527 (Wash. 1980).

2006]

REASONABLE SUSPICIONAND MERE HUNCHES

425

probable cause requirement. Chief Justice Earl Warren, it was said,
struck a Solomonic note, holding a frisk, even if minimally intrusive,
cause
to be a "search," but adding that police need not have probable
66
to conduct a frisk; merely reasonable suspicion is sufficient.
In recent years, however, a growing number of scholars have
had second thoughts about the legal regime supposedly erected by
Terry. Spurring such criticisms on, and seizing the imagination of
some in the academy, are hazy ideas about a civil libertarian pre-Terry
time; alas, like many golden ages, this belongs more in the realm of
mythology than actual history. According to this account, "[N]ever
before in the criminal context had the Court recognized an exception
to the probable cause requirement."67 Allowing police to detain and
frisk suspects with less than probable cause, it is claimed, effected a
dramatic diminution of civil liberties: "Prior to Terry, the Court's
of the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence championed the rights
68
individual in encounters between civilians and the police."
It is a little more complicated than that, but the scholars now
marketing this theory may be forgiven; after all, the Supreme Court
itself led them astray. In Dunaway v. New York, the Court wrote that
"Terry for the first time recognized an exception to the requirement
that Fourth Amendment seizures of persons must be based on
probable cause." 69 According to the Dunaway court,
Terry departed from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in two respects. First, it
defined a special category of Fourth Amendment "seizures" so substantially less
intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth
Amendment "seizures" reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test. Second, the
application of this balancing test led the Court to approve this narrowly defined less

66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-27 (1968).
67. Corinna Barrett Lain, CountermajoritarianHero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court's Role in the Criminal ProcedureRevolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1439 (2004); see also
Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters, Terry's "Seesaw Effect", 56 OKLA. L. REV. 833, 852
(2003) ("Prior to Terry, the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for a criminally-oriented
search or seizure to be deemed constitutionally permissible."); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's
FourthAmendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271, 1308
(1998) ("A search based on police suspicion may be expedient, but it is an intrusion that, prior to
Terry, the Court had declared the Constitution does not permit."). But see Christopher Slobogin,
Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the ProportionalityPrinciple, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1053, 1095 (1998) ("Police were conducting preventive stops and frisks long before that
decision. Most of the special needs searches and seizures that have been approved using Terry's
balancing formula were already routine prior to Terry. Terry didn't alter law enforcement
practices; it just provided, in the hands of the post-Warren Court, a rationale for the status
quo.").
68. Lenese C. Herbert, Bete Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National Security, 9
MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 181 (2003).
69. 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
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intrusive seizure on grounds less rigorous than probable cause, but only for the purpose
70
of a pat-down for weapons.

There is a great deal of compounded error here. First, the
juxtaposition of a "balancing test" on the one hand, and the probable
cause standard on the other, impliedly pictured as an inflexible and
timeless standard, is inaccurate. Probable cause has in fact fluctuated
over time. In the early years of the American republic, probable cause
was a remarkably low (and therefore pro-government) evidentiary
standard.7 1 It rose slightly (therefore tilting in a somewhat civil
libertarian direction) in the early nineteenth-century, 72 only to retreat
73 It
once more to a relatively low standard in the Prohibition era.
became more stringent in the Warren Court's early years, 74 but
retreated in the early years of the Rehnquist Court, 75 only to tilt yet
again in a civil libertarian direction in recent years, at least prior to
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 76 More relevant for our
purposes here, the Dunaway Court, and sundry academics, labor
under the misapprehension that, prior to Terry, police lacked the
authority to detain suspects for investigative reasons unless they had
an evidentiary predicate (often called probable cause) that would
suffice to conduct a full-blown arrest. This is wrong as a matter of
English common law and wrong as a matter of American
constitutional law.
In medieval times, various statutes authorized town guards to
detain "any Stranger" walking the roads at night, 77 and anyone,
during the day or night, who showed an "evil suspicion" of having
committed a felony. 78 The constable was commanded to bring the
70. Id. at 209.
71. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 348 (1813) ("It is contended, that probable cause
means prima facie evidence, or in other words, such evidence as, in the absence of exculpatory
proof, would justify condemnation... [However,] the term 'probable cause,' according to its usual
acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation; and, in all cases of
seizure, has a fixed and well known meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances
which warrant suspicion.") (emphasis added).
72. Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 374 (1824) ("[T]he question, whether the Apollon designed to
engage in this unlawful traffic, must be decided by the evidence in this record, and not by mere
general suspicions drawn from other sources.").
73. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (defining probable cause as merely "a
reasonable ground for belief").
74. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (developing a higher standard for
probable cause).
75. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (finding that probable cause should be
determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis).
76. See Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, supra note 1, at 994-95 (discussing
the use of a more stringent probable cause standard).
77. Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw., c. 4 (Eng.).
78. Statute of Winchester, 1331, 5 Edw. 3, c. 14 (Eng.).
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suspect to a magistrate, who conducted further inquiries to determine
if the suspect had in fact committed a crime. Although the constable's
detention powers waned over the next few centuries, 79 the pendulum
swung back in the seventeenth-century, according to Hale, "in these
times, where felonies and robberies are so frequent."8 0
By the
nineteenth-century, English common law was clear that police had a
power of detention altogether apart from a technical power of arrest.
In one 1810 case, the court curtly dismissed a false imprisonment
claim by a person stopped by a constable when the only apparent
ground for suspicion was that he was carrying a bundle at night. The
court intoned,
In the night, when 'the town is to be asleep, and it is the especial duty of these
watchmen, and other officers, to guard against malefactors, it is highly necessary that
they should have such a power of detention. And, in this case, what do you talk of
groundless suspicion? There was abundant ground of suspicion here. We should be very
81
sorry if the law were otherwise.

Crossing the Atlantic, we find that the law here never
unambiguously "championed the rights of the individual in encounters
between civilians and the police,"8 2 whatever such grandiose language
might mean. As already noted, for various periods in American
history, courts took a relatively lenient attitude towards claims by
government agents that probable cause of criminal activity had
justified a full-blown arrest or property seizure. Indeed, at certain
times officials seem to have had the authority to arrest suspects when,
were the same facts present today, it is unlikely courts would have
countenanced a temporary stop or frisk. For example, in the 1925
case Carrollv. United States, the Supreme Court upheld an arrest for
violation of the Volstead Act on the flimsiest of evidence.8 3 There, a
pair of federal officers, disguised as undercover agents, approached
Carroll about purchasing alcohol.8 4 Carroll expressed interest in the
project, went off to find his source but returned empty-handed and the

79.

See JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND

189 n.2

(Macmillan 1883) ("[Although) [tihe Statute of Winchester was not repealed till 1828, it had for
centuries before that time been greatly neglected.").
80.

2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 149 (Professional Books

Ltd. 1971) (1736).
81. Lawrence v. Hedger, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (1810), quoted in John A. Ronayne, The Right to
Investigate and New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 211, 214 (1964).

Furthermore, the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 permitted London police "to search vessels and
carriages on reasonable suspicion that they were being used to convey stolen goods, and also to
search persons who may be reasonably suspected of such possession." Id.
82. Herbert, supra note 68.
83. 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
84. Id. at 134-35.
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deal fell through.8 5 Two months later, the same Prohibition agents
happened to see Carroll and two other persons driving in an
Oldsmobile not far from the Canadian border, allegedly a source of
alcohol.8 6 On these bare facts, the agents stopped the car, searched it,
and found alcohol "behind the upholstering of the seats."8 7 Chief
Justice Taft, defining probable cause as simply a "reasonable ground
for belief of guilt,"' 8 concluded that probable cause was present
because the area between Detroit and Grand Rapids was "one of the
most active centers for introducing illegally into this country
spirituous liquors" and that Carroll and the other defendants had
89
offered to sell liquor two and a half months before the search.
There is little doubt that Carroll is no longer an accurate
reflection of the detention powers of American police officers.
Consider the following hypothetical: on February 1, a person agrees to
sell drugs to undercover agents, leaves to find his source, and then
returns empty-handed. Two months later, the agents see the same
person driving near a source city for cocaine, arrest him, and search
his car. On these facts, any court would invalidate the arrest and the
search: probable cause, at least as it is now understood, was not
present. Indeed, it is likely that such facts would fail even to rise to
the level of reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop.
There are, it is true, also cases from the early part of the
twentieth-century that are consonant with contemporary notions of
"reasonable suspicion" and the evidentiary predicate needed to justify
any intrusion on a citizen's liberty. For example, the 1923 Michigan
Supreme Court case of People v. Guertins90 closely resembles the 2000
United States Supreme Court case of Florida v. J.L.91 In both cases,

85. Id. at 135.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 136.
88. Id. at 161.
89. Id. at 160 ("They were coming from the direction of the great source of supply for their
stock to Grand Rapids where they plied their trade. That the officers when they saw the
defendants believed that they were carrying liquor we can have no doubt, and we think it is
equally clear that they had reasonable cause for thinking so.").
90. 194 N.W. 561 (Mich. 1923).
91. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). The facts in J.L. were as follows: An anonymous caller reported to
Miami police that at a particular bus stop a young black man wearing a plaid shirt was carrying
a gun. Id. at 266. Police officers arrived at the bus stop and saw three black males "just hanging
out," one of whom was wearing a plaid shirt. Id. Other than the anonymous tip, there was no
reason to suspect the three young men of criminal activity, but police officers approached and
frisked them, and lo and behold the one in a plaid shirt--"ten days shy of his 16th birthday" and
thus immortalized through his initials-was carrying a gun. Id. As Justice Ginsburg noted in a
unanimous opinion reversing the Florida Supreme Court, "All the police had to go on in this case
was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he
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police received an anonymous tip that someone was up to no good
(which in the 1920s meant dealing in alcohol, and eighty years later of
course means narcotics). The Guertins Court, like the J.L. Court, held
that an anonymous tip, taken alone and "without the discloser of the
informant and the source of his information" was insufficient to
92
authorize the police to make an arrest.
Notwithstanding the Guertins case, however, the case law in
the early part of the twentieth-century in general accorded far greater
weight to anonymous tips that were infinitesimally corroborated than
the case law today. Courts in the early twentieth-century, although
reluctant to authorize full-blown arrests based on anonymous tips,
often deemed it reasonable for police officers to forcibly detain
suspects based on anonymous tips and to demand an explanation of
their whereabouts. 93 In one such case, People v.Ward,94 the Michigan
Supreme Court posed an elaborate hypothetical demonstrating this
point. I quote from the Ward opinion at length because it seems so
dramatically different from modern case law, not only in substance
but also in spirit:
Supposing that the officer had been informed by telephone that Harry Ward had robbed
a bank at Spring Lake, had taken a car going in the direction of Grand Haven, and had
the proceeds of the robbery in a suit case; that on the arrival of the car at Grand Haven
he saw the defendant with the suit case in his possession-would not the officer have
been derelict in his duty had he not accosted Ward, asked to see the contents of the suit
case, and, on refusal, placed him under arrest and examined its contents? While the
rights of individuals to be protected from unwarranted arrests must be carefully
guarded, the rights of the public must also be considered. Robberies and holdups are
now so frequent, and the opportunity to get away quickly so convenient that, unless
officers may act promptly on information apparently reliable and circumstances
reasonably convincing, there is but little hope of apprehending the guilty parties. If the
officer must delay to ascertain that the information received comes from a responsible
person, in many cases the opportunity to arrest will have passed. That officers do make
arrests on such information, and that they are complimented on their promptness in
95
doing so, is a matter of common knowledge.

Although "robberies and holdups" are now more frequent than
in the 1920s, courts confronting the facts presented in Ward would be
far more likely to emphasize their role as protectors of civil liberties.
Indeed, on the facts presented in the Ward hypothetical, a modern
American court would likely reach the opposite conclusion and
suppress any evidence.
Imagine that police today received an
knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L."
Id. at 271.
92. Guertins, 194 N.W. at 562.
93. See State v. Kittle, 241 P. 962 (Wash. 1926); Cortes v. State, 185 So. 323 (Fla. 1938); see
also Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201 (1940).
94. 196 N.W. 971 (Mich. 1924).
95. Id. at 51.
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anonymous tip that an individual had robbed a bank and hidden the
proceeds in a suitcase. If police had seen the suspect arrive home and
remove a suitcase from a car trunk, courts would be unlikely to find
96
that the police were authorized to order him to open the suitcase.
The Dunaway Court's statement that Terry effected a radical
break in Fourth Amendment law, bestowing an unprecedented power
on police to stop and search suspects when less than probable cause
was present, is inconsistent with the documentary record. Many
statutes from the first half of the twentieth-century appear to confer
more discretion on police to stop people, at least at night, when they
suspect the person is up to no good; and those same statutes provide
that when the suspect fails to give an adequate explanation of his
whereabouts, police officers can detain him, possibly overnight. For
example:
N.H. Pub. Laws (1926) c.363, § 12: Every watchman may arrest any person whom he
shall find committing any disorder, disturbance, crime or offense, or such as are
strolling about the streets at unreasonable hours, who refuse to give an account, or are
reasonably suspected of giving a false account, of their business or design, or who can
97
give no account of the occasion of their being abroad.
Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c.41, § 98: During the night time [police officers] may examine
all persons abroad whom they have reason to suspect of unlawful design, and may
demand of them their business abroad and whither they are going. .. Persons so
98
suspected who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves . . . may be arrested.

96. Consider, for example, State v. Smith, 839 N.E.2d. 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). The police
received an anonymous tip that one Dwayne Smith lived at 3025 Theresa Street, drove a black
Cadillac, and dealt in cocaine. The informant reported that Smith carried a gun in his car and
hid the cocaine in a Dr. Pepper can. Id. at 452. The police investigated Smith, corroborated that
he owned a black Cadillac and lived on Theresa Street, and further discovered he had been
convicted of involuntary manslaughter a decade earlier. Id. at 452-53. The police opened a 32day investigation of Smith, at one point overhearing a cellular telephone conversation suggesting
a drug buy. Police eventually stopped Smith, who refused to consent to search his car. Id. at 453.
A drug-sniffing dog was hustled to the car (the detention of Mr. Smith amounted to 15 minutes),
and the dog alerted at the passenger side of the car. Id. at 453-54. A Dr. Pepper can stuffed with
crack cocaine was found in the glove compartment. Id. According to the trial judge, "[c]ourts
must be wary of anonymous tips. They could easily result from ulterior motives." Id. at 452. The
judge proceeded to criticize the police officers' testimony at the suppression hearing:
Officer Reynolds testified only that he listened in while the informant set up the drug
buy [during the cellular telephone conversation]. No details were ever produced as to
how Officer Reynolds knew that the informant was talking to Smith, what the exact
date, time, and location of the drug deal would be, or what drugs were to be involved.
The one detail Officer Reynolds provided to the court-that the drug deal was at a
Ferguson Road location-was vague. Officer Reynolds did not even specify where on
Ferguson Road the buy was to take place. And the police stopped Smith before they
could corroborate that he was en route to that location.
Id. at 456.
97.
98.

Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 319-20 n.15 (1942).
Id. at 319.
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Rules and Regulations of the Police Department of Chicago (1933) Rule 465(6) provides:
A person shall be arrested who is found prowling around at night, who is unable or
refuses to give a satisfactory explanation of his conduct under such circumstances, or
who has in his possession dangerous weapons or instruments ordinarily used by
housebreakers.

99

Section 2 of the Uniform Arrest Act of 1942 provides:
A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has reasonable ground to suspect
is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his
name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the
satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed two hours.
Such detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official
record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be
10 0
arrested and charged with a crime.

These laws very much resemble the medieval English
nightwatchmen statutes, which allowed constables to stop and detain
persons even when they lacked probable cause to make an arrest. The
suspect would be taken back to the police station, possibly detained
overnight, and then brought before a magistrate for a determination of
whether there was probable cause to make a full-blown arrest. If
anything, the Dunaway Court's statement that Terry conferred more
discretion on police officers than had existed earlier in the century
gets it exactly backwards. Before Terry, police, when making a stop
based on reasonable suspicion, could demand that the person answer
questions or consent to a search, and if he were to refuse, the police
could simply arrest him then and there. Modern American courts
have held that persons detained during a Terry stop are free to refuse
an officer's request for consent to search his belongings and to refuse
to answer questions (other than the suspect's name), and such refusals
cannot themselves be cited by police as evidence that there was
probable cause to make an arrest.101
D. Terry's Legacy
Despite the breadth of its legacy, the Terry decision was
actually a quite limited one. The sole issue under review was
whether, having struck up a conversation with the three suspects and
having received mumbled answers, McFadden could frisk the men for
99. Id. at 319-20 n.15.
100. Id. at 321.
101. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185-88 (2004).
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weapons.
Chief Justice Warren offered no opinion as to what
McFadden could have done had the three men calmly announced that
they were looking for gifts for their wives and then walked away.
Could the officer have forcibly detained them? For how long? 10 2 Could
he have compelled them to answer questions? To produce
103
identification?
Narrowly read, Terry simply stands for the proposition that
cops can frisk a suspect whom they are questioning when there is
reasonable suspicion to fear for his or her own safety. Given that the
focus of the Terry decision was the safety of police officers, it is
remarkable how quickly the Court expanded the application of the
"reasonable suspicion" evidentiary standard. Over the past 35 years,
the Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of countless
police practices, and repeatedly, the Court has framed the issue as
whether "reasonable suspicion" justified the police actions. Thus,
citing Terry, the Court has upheld the detention of property when
04
there was reasonable suspicion that contraband was inside;
"protective sweeps" of a house when there was reasonable suspicion
that the suspect's armed associates might be present; 0 5 searches of a
car when there was reasonable suspicion that weapons were present
there; 10 6 and search of a probationer's home on basis of reasonable
07
suspicion.
Some critics have lamented the imperialistic nature of the
"reasonable suspicion" standard. 0 8 Probable cause, the competing
102. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 (1985) (upholding a Terry stop of twenty
minutes' duration); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983) (rejecting detention of
ninety minutes).
103. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185-88.
104. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970) (upholding detention of mail
when there was a reasonable suspicion that it contained drugs).
105. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
106. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983).
107. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).
108. See, e.g., E. Martin Estrada, Criminalizing Silence: Hiibel and the Continuing
Expansion of the Terry Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 279, 287 (2005) ("[11t is clear that the
reasonable suspicion standard lends itself to broad applicability. What we are left with, then, is a
haphazard, yet one-directional, broadening of police authority during a Terry stop."); Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to FourthAmendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REV. 383, 402 (1988) ("Instead of carving out a narrow exception to probable cause,
reasonable suspicion became a valid compromise standard that comports with the [F]ourth
[A]mendment if the Court decides that, after balancing the interests, it is reasonable. The
government no longer argues against a presumed starting point of probable cause but rather
argues for reasonable suspicion as a reasonable accommodation of competing interests. Probable
cause becomes merely one point on a continuum of reasonableness."); Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to
Probable Cause: A Brief Response to ProfessorsAmar and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1133,
1136 (1998) ("A broadly defined reasonableness balancing test ... largely places the citizen's
Fourth Amendment fate in the hands of others.").
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evidentiary standard that once served as the North Star of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, has lost much of its luster, and it is to the
reasonable suspicion standard that courts now regularly look for
guidance. It is my contention, argued at oppressive length in another
article, 10 9 that this development is the predictable consequence of the
Court's decision to cast probable cause as a high and inflexible
standard, 11 0 making its very nature inapplicable to the wide range of
actions expected of police.
Courts have rigorously applied the
probable cause standard to full custodial arrests and house searches,
but plainly, a lesser and more nuanced evidentiary standard is
appropriate in other contexts, such as investigatory stops.
How much suspicion is needed to qualify as "reasonable
suspicion"? In United States v. Cortez,"' the Court ruminated on the
meaning of reasonable suspicion and belabored the obvious in noting
that such a term "fall[s] short of providing clear guidance dispositive
of the myriad factual situations that arise." 1 2 "But," the Court
quickly added, "the essence of all that has been written is that the
totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into
account." 113 One wonders what this adds to our understanding. Was
someone suggesting that reasonable suspicion should be based on only
a sliver of the circumstances, a shorn picture? If so, the Court
114
squarely rejects such a view.
Perhaps sensing that the illumination provided is at best
diffuse, the Court proceeded: "Based upon that whole picture the
detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." 115
Presumably, "particularized" and "objective" are to be distinguished
from "generalized" and "subjective," but what separates these two
categories of evidence (the one legitimate, the other not)? Is the fact
that a suspect is loitering in a "high-crime area" particularized or
generalized evidence? Is the fact that a police officer detects anxiety
and nervousness in a suspect objective or subjective evidence? As we
explore in the next Part, the case law applying Terry provides a
muddled answer to questions such as these.
109. See generally Lerner, The Reasonablenessof Probable Cause, supra note 1.
110. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-211 (1979) (discussing the standard for
probable cause).
111. 449 U.S. 411 (1981). The discussion of the meaning of reasonable suspicion in Cortez is
still the basis of Supreme Court decisions interpreting reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002) (quoting and discussing Cortez).
112. Id. at 417.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 417-18 (emphasis added).
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III. THE UNREASONABLE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" STANDARD
Whether a police officer's suspicions authorize a stop and frisk
depends on whether his suspicions were "reasonable"; and that, in
turn, depends on the nature of the evidence adduced by the officer at a
suppression hearing. Reasonableness is equated with objective and
particularized evidence, which is distinguished from subjective and
generalized evidence. Driving the judicial skepticism about the latter
category of evidence is the determination to root out police hunches:
cops can interfere with a citizen's liberty only when the evidence is
somehow objective, and not the product of a subjective sense, feeling,
or instinct. This Part considers the current case law applying Terry v.
Ohio and argues that courts are often too impressed with objective
criteria and too dismissive of subjective criteria. I compare the
probative value assigned to a piece of objective evidence (that a car
has an air freshener, which is supposedly linked to drug dealing) and
a piece of subjective evidence (that a suspect was nervous), and
speculate that, contrary to the reception accorded such evidence in the
courts, it is the latter, not the former evidence, that more highly
correlates with criminal activity. The focus on objective evidence thus
renders the reasonable suspicion standard an unreasonable one in
some circumstances. And when one compares the judicial reception of
police hunches to the hunches of other actors in the judicial system,
one discovers that courts are not skeptical of hunches per se; they are
simply skeptical of cops.
A. Nervousness, "Subjective" Evidence, and "Mere Hunches"
Imagine that a pair of cops are cruising an area with a highcrime rate. The police officers see a car blocking an intersection; the
driver "looks startled" when he realizes that police have arrived at the
scene. The driver, looking anxious, averts his gaze from the police
officers. He reaches over to the console and grabs something. The
police officers decide to investigate, and as they approach, the driver
reaches for something else out of view. One of the officers, fearing for
his safety, orders the driver out of the car and frisks him. During the
frisk, the officer discovers an illegal substance.
Such were the essential facts of United States v. McKoy ' 16 and,
in broad strokes, countless other arrests over the past decades. In
essentials, the government defended the frisk on three grounds: the
suspect's nervousness, his furtive gestures, and the high-crime area in
116. 402 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. Mass. 2004), affirmed, 428 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005).
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which the stop occurred. I consider below the McKoy opinion in some
detail not because it is an especially important decision but quite the
opposite: its ordinariness affords us some insight into the typical
difficulties confronted in a reasonable suspicion decision.
Nervousness. First, Judge Woodlock considered the police
officer's testimony that the suspect "looked away" when the police
made eye contact and "began to act a little nervous." 117 After
acknowledging that "nervousness is a factor the police may consider,"
the judge proceeded to discount the officer's observation."18 He wrote
that nervousness "alone is not sufficient."'1 9 Yet the government was
not arguing that nervousness alone justified the stop. The issue was
whether, taken together with furtive gestures in a high-crime area,
the police officer's observation of unusual nervousness contributed in
any way to a finding of reasonable suspicion. Judge Woodlock added
that "[n]ervousness is a natural reaction to police presence,"' 20 an
observation generally offered in opinions that culminate in
disregarding the officer's testimony on this score.
According to Judge Woodlock, "[n]ervousness may even
21
warrant less weight when it is manifested in particular contexts."'
In something of a detour, he then quotes a lengthy passage from
Justice Stevens's dissenting 22 opinion in Illinois v. Wardlow,123 where
the question was whether a suspect's headlong flight when a dozen
police cars converged provided reasonable suspicion for a stop and
frisk:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas,
there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or
without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart
from any criminal activity associated with the officer's sudden presence ....
[U]nprovoked flight can occur for other, innocent reasons.124

117. Id. at 312.
118. Id. at 317.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Judge Woodlock identifies Stevens's opinion as "concurring in part and dissenting in
part," which is technically true. Id. at 317-18. Stevens concurred insofar as he rejected the
suspect's argument that flight could never contribute to a finding a reasonable suspicion. But
while Stevens rejected a per se rule, he agreed with the defendant that, on the facts present,
flight did not lead to a finding of reasonable suspicion. In this respect, Stevens dissented from the
majority, which held that "[h]eadlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of
evasion." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. McKoy, 402 F. Supp. 2d. at 317 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132-33 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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Immediately after quoting Stevens's dissenting opinion, Judge
Woodlock ambiguously notes, "Much the same could be said about
1 25
nervousness in the presence of police officers."
There was, however, a significant difference between the facts
of Wardlow and McKoy. In the former, four police cars converged,
sirens blazing. In such a circumstance, a wholly innocent person may
well be startled into headlong flight. And yet even on these facts, it is
worth recalling, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices found that
"headlong flight" is still the "consummate act of evasion."' 26 The
suspect in McKoy was sitting in a car at an intersection one afternoon
when a single police car pulled up. Surely, such a situation is less
startling and less likely, in and of itself, to generate feelings of anxiety
on the part of an innocent person.
Stevens's observation that "those residing in high crime
areas"'127 may be more fearful of the police is repetitively cited in lower
court opinions, 128 but one might pause to consider its accuracy. The
suggestion seems to be that nervousness among minorities is less
probative of criminality than nervousness in non-minorities. How do
we (or Justice Stevens) know that? When lower courts suggest the
heightened nervousness of minorities, the proof, such as it is, consists
of a citation to Stevens's dissenting opinion from Wardlow, bolstered
perhaps by a law review article or two, but it is doubtful that many
law professors or judges have any first-hand knowledge of the feelings
of inner city minorities.
True, there are empirical studies that
indicate minorities have somewhat more negative feelings towards the
police than non-minorities, 2 9 but this may suggest that minorities

125. Id. at 318.
126. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
127. Id. at 132.
128. See, e.g., State v. Nicholson, No. M2004-00111-CCA-R3CD, 2005 WL 434646, at *6, *9
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2005); State v. Jordan, 817 N.E.2d 864, 877, 879 (Ohio 2004); State v.
Kelly, 119 S.W.3d 587, 594-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
129. See, e.g., Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive
Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 148 n.48 (2003) (noting that "[f]ifty-eight percent of
Blacks, compared to 20% of whites, believe that police do not treat all races fairly" (citing
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

STATISTICS 119 (2001))). But cf.James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth As Assets, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (2004) ("[The strength of ghetto feelings about hostile police
conduct may even be exceeded by the conviction that ghetto neighborhoods are not given
adequate police protection." (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 307 (1968))); George L. Kelling,

Acquiring A Taste for Order: The Community and Police, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 90, 94 (1987)
("Despite the contrary belief of some citizens and police that minority residents do not respect
police, the great majority do.... They believe that police have not been a tangible presence,
engaged with citizens to develop neighborhood peace and security.").
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would be more hostile (perhaps legitimately) when police arrived on a
scene, not that they would necessarily be more nervous.
In any event, underlying the McKoy opinion, and numerous
others, is skepticism about the probative value of a police officer's
testimony that a suspect is "nervous." 130 Virtually any behavior has
been deemed suspiciously nervous by police officers. 131 In some cases,
officers testify that nervousness is evidenced when a suspect avoids
eye contact. 132 In other cases, nervousness is discerned when suspects
repeatedly stare at police officers. 133 Some suspects display their
nervousness by being "jittery;"'3 4 others by being too calm. 135 As one
judge complained,
This court has heard every imaginable basis for searching so-called 'suspicious' luggage:
it is old, it is new; it had a handwritten identification tag or it did not; it is a soft bag, a
garment bag, a duffel bag; the possessor is too nervous, too self-assured, too calm, too
36
jittery; the bags are overstuffed or they are underpacked.1

Although police officers will informally tell you that they can somehow
distinguish
between
ordinary
nervousness
and
suspicious
nervousness, one may wonder whether they are deluding themselves
as to their powers of observation. A panel of the Tenth Circuit
suggested as much in one case:
Nothing in the record indicates whether Agent Ochoa had any prior knowledge of
Defendant, so we do not understand how Agent Ochoa would know whether Defendant
was acting nervous and excited or whether he was merely acting in his normal manner.
Rather, Defendant's appearance to Agent Ochoa is nothing more than an "inchoate
13 7
suspicion or hunch.

130. McKoy, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 317-18.
131. Cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring
to a drug profile's "chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations" (quoting
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987))).
132. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 892 So.2d 71, 76 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that the
"defendant appeared extremely nervous and fidgety, [and] refused to make eye contact").
133. See, e.g., United States v. West, No. 03-3700, 2004 WL 1465690, at *2 (3rd Cir. June 30,
2004) (stating that "the totality of the circumstances supports a finding of reasonable suspicion"
because the defendants "appeared hesitant to exit their car, repeatedly stared at the agents
when entering the store, and even tripped over each other while walking back to the car").
134. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 103 P.3d 908, 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (stating that the
defendant appeared "jittery" because he was "placing his hands in his pockets, removing them,
putting them back in his pockets").
135. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 955 F.2d 976, 982 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that
"Cardona appeared 'too calm"').
136. United States v. Va Lerie, No. 8:03CR23, 2003 WL 21956437, at *5 (D. Neb. Aug. 14,
2003).
137. United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1458 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal citations
omitted).
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An officer's testimony that a suspect was nervous is
occasionally credited, 138 but many courts have doubted how the officer
could reasonably make such a judgment and therefore minimize its
significance in a reasonable suspicion determination. 139
As a
Minnesota state court recently explained, "[T]he officer must
demonstrate objective facts to justify that suspicion and may not base
it upon a mere hunch. Nervousness alone is not an objective fact, but
'140
a subjective assessment derived from the officer's perceptions.
When a police officer reports his sense that a suspect was unusually
nervous, even if he is being wholly honest, he is merely confessing his
subjective impression-a mere hunch.
High-crime area. The next factor Judge Woodlock considered
was that the encounter occurred in a high-crime area. There are
literally hundreds of opinions in which courts have struggled with the
relevance of this factor in reasonable suspicion determinations. 14 1 As
Judge Woodlock notes, the police are permitted to cite this factor, but
"alone [it] is not a sufficient basis to support a frisk or even, for that
matter, a stop." 142 (Again, no one suggested as much; the issue was
the relevance of the prevalence of crime in the area taken together
with other factors.) To be sure, the facts in McKoy were compelling on
this score. In the week prior to the stop there had been two shootings
at security vehicles reported in the area. One might think that it was
objectively reasonable for the police officers to be wary as they

138. See State v. Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d 328, 337-38 (Iowa 2001) (finding that defendant's
nervousness near the trunk of the vehicle created reasonable suspicion to call for drug dog); see
also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that "no
individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was required to call the canine unit"
because the defendants did not have authority to drive the car, but that alternatively, there was
reasonable suspicion to wait for the drug dog based on defendant's "extreme nervousness" and
"inconsistent statements"); United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 912-13, 918-19 (8th Cir.
1994) (concluding that the wait for the drug dog justified by defendant's nervousness, evasive
answers, and refusal to consent to search).
139. State v. Gibson, 108 P.3d 424, 432-33 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005) ("[A] person's nervous
demeanor during such an encounter is of limited significance in establishing the presence of
reasonable suspicion."). Accord Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879
(10th Cir.1994); Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 475 (2001).
140. State v. Rahkola, Nos. A03-1614, A03-1615, 2004 WL 1327339, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 15, 2004) (emphasis added).
141. Compare State v. Wilson, No. 84117, 2005 WL 273050, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb 3, 2005)
("Even in high crime areas, a citizen is entitled to the presumption that he obeys the law."), with
D.T.B. v. State, 892 So.2d 522, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]hether the stop occurs in a
high crime area is a relevant factor to be considered in a Terry analysis." (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968))).
142. United States v. McKoy, 402 F. Supp. 2d. at 318.
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Judge Woodlock escapes this conclusion as

[W]hile a factor, the neighborhood is one with limited significance in this case,
particularly where no connection was made by the government between the nature of
the crimes committed in the neighborhood and the violation suspected here ... [t]his is
not a case where the police had reason to suspect the presence of firearms based on the
type of crime suspected. The only reason for the stop was a traffic violation. No
assumption about weapons can be drawn from Mr. McKoy's traffic violation ... Nor is
there any indication that they suspected Mr. McKoy was involved in the two recent
14 3
nighttime shootings of security car windows.

Judge Woodlock's point in McKoy seems to be that although
there was an objective basis for suspicion as they patrolled the area
near the intersection of Maple and Cheney Streets, the suspicion was
not particularized to the suspect McKoy:
It is not enough to say that such events occur in the area or even that two specific events
occurred recently in the neighborhood, for then everybody stopped for a traffic violation
that week would be subject to the presumption regardless of whether their conduct could
144
fairly be interpreted as dangerous.

The district judge seems to have distorted the government's claim,
which was not that everyone stopped for a traffic violation near the
intersection of Maple and Cheney Streets could be frisked, but that
this particular suspect could be frisked, given his nervousness and
furtive gestures.
The nub of the problem under the current case law is drawing
an intelligible distinction between particularized and generalized
evidence. The Supreme Court in United States v. Cortez emphasized
that "particularized" evidence could contribute to a reasonable
suspicion finding, and in so doing, it implicitly excluded generalized
evidence. 145 In what category does "high-crime area" fall? In Arvizu,
the Court included several factors as contributing to a finding of
reasonable suspicion, one of them that the van was "registered to an
address... that was four blocks north of the border in an area
notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling." 146 Such evidence seems
"generalized," just like the McKoy defendant's presence in a highcrime area, but the Supreme Court in Arvizu nonetheless deemed it
relevant, at least when added to other pieces of evidence more directly
147
linked to the suspect.
143. Id. at 318-19.
144. Id. at 319.
145. 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
146. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 271 (2002).
147. Id. at 271, 277 (noting that the stop occurred "in an area notorious for alien and
narcotics smuggling," the court found that "[iut was reasonable for Stoddard to infer from his
observations, his registration check, and his experience as a border patrol agent that respondent
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That said, the regularity with which police officers cite the
"high-crime area" in which a stop occurred does give one pause.
Concurring in the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in United States v.
Montero-Camargo,148 Judge Kozinski complained about the use of this
factor in reasonable suspicion decisions:
Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a badge may
see every corner of his beat as a high crime area. Police are trained to detect criminal
activity and they look at the world with suspicious eyes. This is a good thing, because
we rely on this suspicion to keep us safe from those who would harm us. But to rely on
every cop's repertoire of war stories to determine what is a "high crime area"--and on
that basis to treat otherwise innocuous behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion14 9
strikes me as an invitation to trouble.

Granted, the facts regarding the "high-crime area" in McKoy were
quite compelling-the two shootings at security vehicles in the past
week-but what if there had been only one shooting, and what if it
had been a month ago? At what point does a neighborhood qualify as
"high-crime" for Terry purposes? 150 In a recent case, a suspect asked
the Seventh Circuit to require the police to provide "specific data"
confirming their claim that a stop occurred in a high-crime area, but
the court rejected the invitation. 151
It is not surprising that most criminals are stopped in
neighborhoods where most crimes occur (also known as "high-crime
areas"); what is surprising is that some courts seem to find it
preferable to defer to a police officer's testimony that a stop occurred
in a "high-crime area" than an officer's testimony about a suspect's
nervousness. Surely, the former gives the officer nearly as much
carte-blanche as the latter. Given the courts' preference for certain
kinds of testimony, however, one would predict police officers to craft
their testimony accordingly; and one indeed finds officers reciting
"high crime area" like a mantra in suppression hearings. MonteroCamargo is an illustrative case, in which police officers stopped a car
that made a U-turn just before it was to have been stopped at a
had set out from Douglas along a little-traveled route used by smugglers to avoid the 191
checkpoint").
148. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
149. Id. at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
150. Compare United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 248 (7th Cir. 1999) ("In less than one
year there had been some 2,500 drug arrests in the five-block-by-five-block area where the
incident occurred."), with United States v. Morales, 191 F.3d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1999) ("In the
past year alone, the Agent had detained approximately 600 illegal aliens on this stretch of the
highway.").
151. United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005). But see United States v.
Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Specific data, not 'mere war stories,' are
required to establish that an area deserves to be termed a 'high crime area."' (quoting United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1139 n.32 (9th Cir. 2000))).
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checkpoint.152 Ninth Circuit case law bafflingly prohibited police
officers from citing this piece of evidence (apparently, innocent drivers
153
regularly make U-turns as they approach checkpoints).
Consequently, the police officers in Montero-Camargo loaded up their
testimony with as many acceptable "objective" pieces of evidence as
possible. 15 4 By denying the relevance of the U-turn, Ninth Circuit case
law implicitly demanded that police officers say different things.
Judge Kozinski wrote,
It also creates an incentive for officers to exaggerate or invent factors, just to make sure
that the judges who review the case will approve their balancing act. I understand that
it's not always possible to eliminate uncertainty, and that weighing and balancing is the
stuff of many legal doctrines. But what excuse is there for resorting to a totality-of-thecircumstances approach when a single factor-the turnaround right before the
15 5
checkpoint-alone justifies the search?

As Judge Kozinski notes, courts seem to forget that police officers, just
like criminals, respond to judicial decisions; and if courts signal their
skepticism about "nervousness" testimony, police officers will simply
alter what they say. Whether they will meaningfully alter their
behavior is another question altogether.
Furtive gestures. Finally we come to the suspect's furtive
gestures in McKoy, yet another factor that appears in countless Terry
opinions, some courts according it weight, 156 others not. 157 Of course,
there are movements, and then there are furtive movements, and one
cannot necessarily assume that any deviation from immobility gives
rise to suspicion. After all, unnatural stiffness may also be cited as a
factor contributing to reasonable suspicion, as was the case in Arvizu.
Judge Woodlock writes, "The movement must be interpreted in
context to determine if it is actually furtive, if it in fact gives rise to a
'
reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous. "158
The government in McKoy argued that the gestures cited by
the police officers as suspicious were similar to movements deemed
152. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1126-28.
153. See United States v. Ogilvie, 527 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that "turning off
the highway and turning around [are] not in themselves suspicious" (quoted in MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d at 1137)).
154. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1131-32.
155. Id. at 1142 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
156. State v. T.N.T., No. 47166-0-I, 2001 WL 537884, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. May 21, 2001)
("Factors relevant to a reasonable safety concern include ... furtive gestures.").
157. See, e.g., Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 443 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The Ohio Court of
Appeals' use of the phrase "furtive gestures" is a characterization, not an independent fact. From
our review, there is no objective evidence in this record that would support the trooper's opinion
upon which the Ohio Court of Appeals relied for its characterizations that Petitioner and his
companion exhibited furtive gestures.").
158. United States v. McKoy, 402 F.Supp. 2d at 320.
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furtive in other cases. 159 Judge Woodlock, however, sifted through the
facts of the cases cited and concluded otherwise. 160 (In one case, he
conceded, the facts were similar, but he criticized the decision as "too
broad.")' 61 For example, Judge Woodlock distinguished United States
v. Nash,162 where an Illinois state trooper stopped a car in Gullport,
Illinois, in the early morning. As the trooper approached, he saw the
driver reach toward the floor of the car. 163 The driver's face was
unshaven and puffy and his breath smelled of alcohol. 164 In addition,
a jacket was tucked under the driver's lap and stretched onto the
floor.16 5 The Seventh Circuit upheld the officer's decision to frisk the
suspect.166 Judge Woodlock cabined the implications of the case to
miniscule dimensions: "The proposition for which Nash stands is that
a sole officer, approaching a car driven by someone who appears
disheveled and drunk and having witnessed movement toward an
area of the car where he later sees something that could obscure a
67
weapon, may conduct a limited search for weapons."'
Judge Woodlock is surely right that there are factual
differences between McKoy and Nash, but there were similarities as
well, as he notes: In both cases, suspects during traffic stop violations
made "volitional movements" that sparked concern on the part of
police officers.
Yes, in Nash the suspect appears to have been
inebriated, but under Judge Woodlock's reasoning, it is not clear why
this provides grounds for a frisk as there is "no connection" between
the consumption of alcohol and the possession of a firearm. And yes, it
is true that in Nash a single officer approached the car, whereas in
McKoy a pair of officers approached, but one would need to explain
how the threat to Officer Joyce, as he approached the driver's side of
the car, was so substantially diminished by the fact that his partner
was trailing him and approaching the passenger side. The most
significant distinction is the presence of the coat on the suspect's lap,
but surely this is susceptible to an innocent explanation-the stop
occurred on an early morning in November. Meanwhile, there were
factors present in McKoy that were not present in Nash-the suspect
was nervous and, more importantly, in the very area where the stop

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 319-22.
Id. at 322.
Id.
876 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1360.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1360-61.
United States v. McKoy, 402 F.Supp. 2d at 320.
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occurred there were two shootings at security vehicles less than a
week earlier.
In which of the two scenarios would it be more objectively
reasonable for a police officer to fear for his safety? It is difficult for
me to say, as I would be terrified in either scenario. Judge Woodlock,
however, drew a clear distinction between the two cases:
The only indications in this case that Mr. McKoy was dangerous were (a) generalized
notions regarding the neighborhood, not inferences drawn from his suspected crime, and
(b) movements and nervousness in the presence of police, not physical reactions in
contravention of an order to stop moving or apparent efforts at concealment. To admit
the evidence would be a legal determination that if one commits a traffic violation in a
high-crime neighborhood he will be subject to a frisk whenever he appears nervous and
moves. The case law does not support such a simplistic and far-reaching conclusion and
16 8
I decline to adopt it.

According to the district court, denying the defendant's suppression
motion in this case would be tantamount to conferring unlimited
discretion on police officers in high-crime areas. After all, they will
always be able to claim that the suspect was nervous and furtive, and
therefore they will be able to stop and frisk every suspect. Earlier in
the opinion, Judge Woodlock quoted approvingly from a law review
article that complained that "[o]bservations of minimal significance
are sometimes elevated to reasonable suspicion based on the character
of the neighborhood in which the suspect is found." 169 But surely
"observations of minimal significance" could become significant in
context, a point to which I will return to this point later in the
170
Article.
B. Car Fresheners,Objective Evidence, and the Base Rate Fallacy
We turn now to more concrete and objective evidence. Courts
are more receptive when police officers announce that they saw a
"bulge" in a suspect's pocket,' 7' that the suspect carried a pager, 172 or
that the suspect's origin was one of the countless source cities of illegal
narcotics.' 73 This evidence, the thinking goes, is not a "mere hunch" or
168. Id. at 322.
169. Id. at 319 n.ll (quoting Margaret Raymond, Down the Corner, Out in the Street:
Consideringthe Characterof the Neighborhood in EvaluatingReasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 99, 100-01 (1999)).
170. See infra at text accompanying notes 223-224.
171. See, e.g., State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 523 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (approving
frisk when police report a "characteristic bulge in the suspect's clothing").
172. See, e.g., United States v. Kirkpatrick, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057-58 (D. Neb. 1998)
(determining that one of the factors supporting reasonable suspicion was that the suspect was
carrying a pager).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Wisniewski, 358 F. Supp. 2d. 1074, 1089 (D. Utah 2005).
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subjective impression, but something objective, and therefore worthy
of more serious attention.
A curious example of objective evidence, which has spawned a
surprisingly substantial body of case law, is the presence of one or
more deodorizers in a suspect's car. In dozens of cases, police officers
or highway troopers cite this piece of evidence as a factor contributing
to reasonable suspicion; for as police repeatedly tell judges at
suppression motions, drug traffickers frequently use such devices in
the belief that they mask the odor of drugs. In general, courts credit
this testimony, 174 which suggests the following puzzle: Why are
judges, who are so wary of police officers when they announce that a
suspect was "nervous," relatively deferential when police officers
testify as to the significance of car fresheners in signaling the presence
of drugs?
A moment's reflection should make one realize that, in and of
itself, the existence of a car deodorizer is of very little significance in
deciding whether a car contains drugs, even if, as the police regularly
maintain, many drug traffickers use such devices.
We have no
empirical studies as to what percentage of drug traffickers use car
fresheners, but let us assume that the overwhelming majority, or 80
percent, do. Of course, some innocent people also like to freshen their
cars. Let us assume that 5 percent of innocent people use car
fresheners. Courts (and possibly also the police) seem to be duped into
thinking, apparently on the basis of such "evidence," that a car
freshener can give rise to reasonable suspicion.
But such thinking is flawed. It is premised on a base rate
fallacy, 175 that is, a failure to consider the natural frequency in which
drug traffickers prowl our nation's highways. Let us assume that a
mere 0.1 percent (or 1 in a 1000) of the nation's drivers are
transporting drugs, at least at any randomly chosen point along the
nation's highways and byways. In any random sampling of 10,000
drivers, then, there will be 10 drug traffickers and 9,990 innocents. Of
174. See, e.g., United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 786 n.9 (4th Cir. 2004); State v.
O'Meara, 9 P.3d 325, 327 (Ariz. 2000); State v. Taylor, No. 990753-CA, 2000 WL 33250186, at *1
(Utah Ct. App. May 4, 2000) (noting that "the scent of air freshener, without 'other indicia of
criminal activity' is not enough to create a reasonable suspicion" (quoting United States v.
Alvarez, 68 F.3d 1242, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 1995) (McKay, J., concurring)); United States v.
Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 919 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc); State v. Guzman, 879 P.2d 114, 116 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1994); United States v. Sanchez-Valderuten, 11 F.3d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Solis-Serrano, No. 92-2095, 1992 WL 372405, at *4 (10th Cir. 1992); State v. Alonzo,
587 So.2d 136, 140 (La. Ct. App. 1991); United States v. Reyna, 546 F.2d 103, 103-04 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Medina, 543 F.2d 553, 553 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. GutierrezEspinosa, 516 F.2d 249, 250 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Alvarado, 519 F.2d 1133, 1135 (5th
Cir. 1975).
175. Cf. GIGERENZER, supra note 12, at 28.
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the 10 drug traffickers, 80 percent, or 8 will have car fresheners. Of
the 9,990 innocents, 5 percent, or 500, will car fresheners. Thus, in
any group of 10,000 drivers, a total of 508 will have car fresheners.
The upshot: The percentage of drivers with car fresheners who are
drug traffickers is 8/508 or just 1.57 percent.
Some federal judges, writing in dissent, have alluded to this
point, albeit without resort to numbers or pretentious citations to the
"base rate fallacy."'176 As Judge McMillian, dissenting in an en banc
decision of the Eighth Circuit, wrote, "the 'masking odor' factor could
apply to millions of motorists who use car deodorizers."'177 Although
true, one should not minimize the significance of car fresheners.
Assuming my arbitrary numbers bear some relation to reality, a car
with a freshener has a 8/508, or 1.57 percent likelihood of harboring a
drug trafficker, while a car with no freshener has only a 2/9492, or a
.021 percent likelihood. Nonetheless, in and of itself, the car
freshener's presence is not nearly as significant as courts (and perhaps
troopers) seem to think, for only 1-2 percent of the cars with
fresheners are carrying drugs.
This raises the comparative question: Which piece of evidence,
taken alone, is more probative of criminal activity-the objective
presence of a car freshener or a police officer's subjective impression
that a suspect is unusually nervous? Alternatively put, if the only
piece of evidence one knew was either that (a) a car had a freshener or
(b) an experienced police officer had a "mere hunch," which factor-the
objective or the subjective one-better predicts the presence of drugs?
We have, of course, no hard data with which to answer the question,
but it seems entirely possible, or even probable, that a "mere hunch" is
more probative.
Consider that in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,178 the
Indianapolis Police Department set up six roadblocks at selected
locations and conducted random stops. Of the 1,161 cars stopped over
a three month period, an astonishing 104 arrests were made. (Fiftyfive arrests were made for drug-related crimes and another forty-nine
were for offenses unrelated to drugs.) 79 The resulting hit rate was
nearly 9 percent. It is possible, then, that simply by using their
knowledge of Indianapolis and the preferred routes of drug traffickers,

176. See Foreman, 369 F.3d at 796 (Gregory, J., dissenting) ("The prevalence of [car
fresheners] in American automobiles does little to eliminate innocent people within the context
of reasonable articulable suspicion."); Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 924 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
177. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 924 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
178. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
179. Id. at 34-35.
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police were able to attain a far higher success rate than would have
180
been obtained had they stopped every car with a car freshener.
But let us assume that police are relatively inept in their
hunches, and only 1 percent of their subjective and inchoate
impressions prove accurate. It is still worth noting that when police
have a hunch about someone and that person has a freshener in his
car, the odds that the person is a drug trafficker may become
relatively substantial. (I am assuming that it is not because of the
presence of the car freshener that the officer develops a hunch.)
Suppose that of any 10,000 people stopped by police due to a "mere
hunch" only 1 percent, or 100 will be drug traffickers, and 9900 will be
innocent. Of the 100 drug traffickers, 80 will have car fresheners and
of the 9900 innocents, 495 will too. So, of the sample of 575 car
fresheners, 80/575 or 14 percent will be indicative of drug traffickers.
If we assume that police are somewhat better, but still quite inept, in
their hunches and that they generate true positives 5 percent of the
time, the numbers become even more compelling. Then, if a police
officer has a hunch and the person has a car freshener, the suspect
will be a drug trafficker 46 percent of the time.1 8 1 The upshot is that
an "objective" piece of evidence, such as the presence of a car
freshener, only becomes statistically meaningful when it exists in
tandem with another, often subjective, piece of evidence, such as an
impression of anxiety or even a "mere hunch." Yet courts persist,
following Warren's opinion in Terry, in deprecating "mere hunches."
C. Hunches and Demeanor Evidence in the JudicialSystem
But a caveat is now in order. Courts are not disparaging of all
hunches. It is often assumed that prosecutors, jurors, and judges
gather genuine information on the basis of nonverbal cues, and the
judicial system, far from discounting this information, treats these
evaluations as valuable and worthy of deference.

180. The Supreme Court overturned the random checkpoints in Edmond because its purpose
was a "general interest in crime" and not a non-law enforcement purpose that would qualify the
program for treatment under the more deferential "special needs" jurisprudence. Thus, police
have more leeway when searching for drunk drivers than for drug dealers-a result that defies
easy explanation. Id. at 46-48.
181. Of the 10,000 people stopped and as to whom the police have a hunch, 500 will be drug
traffickers and 9,500 will be innocent. Of the former, 80 percent, or 400 will have car fresheners;
of the latter, 5 percent or 475 will have car fresheners. Therefore, car fresheners indicate drug
traffickers 400/875 or 46 percent of the time.
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1. Prosecutors
Imagine that at a suppression hearing a police officer conceded,
"I [didn't] like the way he look[ed], with the way the hair [was]
cut ....
And the mustache and the beard look[ed] suspicious to me."
If on the basis of this, for lack of a better word, hunch, a police officer
stopped a person, there is not the slightest doubt that any evidence
eventually obtained would be suppressed as the product of an illegal
stop. For surely the officer's impression of how someone "looked," as
well as the cut of his mustache and beard, does not qualify as
reasonablesuspicion. In the case Purkett v. Elem,18 2 however, such an
admission was made-and no illegality was found. The author of the
statement was not a police officer, however, but a prosecutor, who was
justifying his use of a peremptory strike against a potential juror. 8 3
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that
the "state's explanation constituted a legitimate 'hunch,"' 18 4 and the
United States Supreme Court agreed.
Courts regularly condone prosecutorial hunches in the context
of equal protection (or Batson) challenges to peremptory strikes of
prospective jurors. The typical sequence of events begins with a
defendant claiming that a prosecutor used his peremptory challenges
to systematically remove minorities from the jury panel. A Batson
motion is made, followed by the prosecutor mumbling something about
the juror's hair 8 5 or "body language"1 8 6 or jewelry1 8 7 or youth 8 8 or
apparent intelligence. 8 9 Then, to complete the protocol, a trial judge
holds (on the basis of his observation of the prosecutor) that the
proffered reasons were "race-neutral," and therefore legitimate. At
the risk of belaboring the point, if a police officer offered such

182. 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
183. Id. at 766.
184. State v. Elem, 747 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
185. State v. Jones, 729 So.2d 57, 61 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (purple-haired juror struck).
186. State v. Brown, No. 19236, 2003 WL 21210456, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 23, 2003)
(struck juror's "body language" suggested he was impressed by defense counsel); State v. McRae,
494 N.W. 2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1992) (stating that "the demeanor of the juror, the tone used in
responding, and other similar factors certainly are factors that a trial court may consider in
reviewing the prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge"); United States v. Forbes, 816
F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) (peremptory strike based on body language was acceptable).
187. State v. Banks, 694 So.2d 401, 408, (La. Ct. App. 1997) (juror wore gold jewelry and a Tshirt and alleged he was disabled).
188. State v. Perrilloux, 864 So.2d 843, 849-50 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (juror was too young and
wearing a gold and diamond earring).
189. State v. Herring, 762 N.E.2d 940, 953 (Ohio 2002) (prosecutor regarded juror as "not too
bright" given that "[h]er hobbies [listed on a questionnaire] are eating, doing hair and watching
Oprah").
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"reasons" as the justification for a three-minute Terry stop, the court
would ridicule him; but when a prosecutor, for the very same reasons,
strikes a prospective juror, courts generally defer, 190 exalting the
prosecutor's ability to act on a mere "hunch."191 In her concurring
opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B, 192 Justice O'Connor defended
the institution of peremptory challenges, noting that its
"essential nature is that it is exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and
without being subject to the court's control." Indeed, often a reason for it cannot be
stated, for a trial lawyer's judgments about a juror's sympathies are sometimes based on
experienced hunches and educated guesses, derived from a juror's responses at voir dire
19 3
or a juror's "bare looks and gestures."

Contrary to the implicit rationale of Terry, O'Connor here concedes
that not all reasonable suspicions are articulable.
After citing
secondary literature stating that "nonverbal cues can be better than
verbal responses at revealing a juror's disposition," she concludes,
"experienced lawyers will often correctly intuit which jurors are likely
to be the least sympathetic, and our understanding that the lawyer
will often be unable to explain the intuition, [is] the very reason we
194
cherish the peremptory challenge."'

190. The phenomenon has its critics. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal
Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931,
1019 (1983) (criticizing the Court for permitting preemptory strikes against blacks in the
absence of a compelling state reason and "on the basis of a prosecutor's whim or hunch").
191. See, e.g., United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1555 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Peremptory
challenges are based upon professional judgment and educated hunches rather than research.");
Straughter v. State, 801 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. App. 1990) ("A challenge to a juror may be based
upon the manner in which the juror reacts to defense counsel, as well as upon the juror's verbal
statements in the record. The State may also base its peremptory strikes on the prosecutor's
legitimate 'hunches' and past experience, as long as such strikes are not racially motivated.").
But see United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
prosecutor failed to satisfy his burden of production when he stated that he struck a black juror
because he "just got a feeling about him").
192. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
193. Id. at 147-48 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220
(1965) (emphasis added)).
194. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Judge Richard P. Matsch, chief judge of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado, was asked: "Do you believe peremptory challenges still
serve any purpose other than allowing a lawyer's whimsy and hunch to play into jury selection?"
He answered, "I believe that intuition is an important and legitimate reason for excluding
persons from jury service in every case. Peremptory challenges serve that purpose." Sandra I.
Rothenberg, Question and Answer with Judge Richard P. Matsch, 14 CRIM. JUST. 26, 27 (1999).
An anonymous critic of this Article argues that I misunderstand the dynamics of a peremptory
challenge under Batson. He notes that "[tihe prosecutor does not offer the hunch to show that
the claimed fact is true ('younger people are more tolerant of drug use than older people');
instead she reveals the hunch to the court simply to show that her reason for a peremptory strike
is unrelated to race or gender." There may be merit to this criticism, but the language quoted
above from Judge Matsch, like the passage in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in J.E.B. v.
Alabama, suggests that there is a prevalent belief that the prosecutor's intuition reflects some
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Judicial deference to prosecutors is not confined to the Batson
context. The criminal justice system gives vast deference to the
intuitions and hunches of prosecutors. As Professors Bibas and
Biershbach write, "Contrition and apologies influence prosecutors'
decisions, including decisions not to charge, to accept proposed pleas,
to enter into cooperation agreements, and to recommend favorable
sentences." 19 5 In effect, then, the judicial system implicitly recognizes
that a prosecutor has an ability to distinguish between the truly
penitent and those merely scheming to obtain an advantage.
2. Judges
Whatever misgivings judges might have about police officers
acting intuitively, they seem to credit their own hunches. At the turn
of the twentieth-century, judges at least had misgivings about
candidly admitting this belief. When asked whether he would
consider publishing a series of lectures at Yale Law School describing
the judicial decision-making process, Benjamin Cardozo remarked, "If
it were published, I would be impeached. 19 6
His hesitation
apparently arose from concern that his frank praise for the "trained
intuition" 197 of the judge would upset legal formalist notions of the
judge as scientist, coldly and impersonally bringing detached reason to
bear on any problem. To the contrary, Cardozo wrote, "The doctrine of
the hunch, if viewed as an attempt at psychological analysis, embodies
an important truth: it is a vivid and arresting description of one of the
198
stages in the art of thought."
This view would soon be elaborated upon by Judge Joseph
Hutcheson, a self-described convert from legal formalism to a more
intuitive approach to judging. Hutcheson explained,
[W]hen the case is difficult or involved ... I, after canvassing all the available material
at my command, and duly cogitating upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding
over the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch-that intuitive flash of understanding

real insight into the nature of things. If it did not reflect such genuine insight, why would judges
be willing to credit it as anything other than a coded way of masking their irrational racial
prejudices?
195. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse And Apology Into
CriminalProcedure,114 YALE L.J. 85, 94 (2005).
196. Arthur L. Corbin, The Judicial Process Revisited: Introduction, 71 YALE L.J. 195, 198
(1961).
197. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 93 (1924), quoted in Richard H.

Weisberg, A Response On Cardozo To Professors Kaufman And Schwartz, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
535, 536 (2000).
198. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Jurisprudence,in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN

CARDOZO, 27-28 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947), quoted in Dan Simon, A Psychological Mode of
JudicialDecision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 120 (1998).
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which makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and at the point
- 19 9
where the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along the way

A few years later, Jerome Frank, a Chicago attorney destined for the
bench, wrote Law and the Modern Mind. For Frank,
[t]he process of judging... seldom begins with a premise from which a conclusion is
subsequently worked out. Judgment begins rather the other way around-with a
conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily starts with such a conclusion
200
and afterwards tries to find premises which will substantiate it.

When Frank, a decade later, ascended to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, he used his bully pulpit to mock the
"cloistered scholars,"20 1 who persisted in the view of the law as a coldly
rational enterprise. Springing forward to the late twentieth-century,
the "legal realism" that was once outr6 is now pass6. Such varied
jurists as William Brennan, 2 2 Richard Posner, 20 3 Patricia Wald, 20 4 and
Judith Kaye 20 5 have all embraced the view that intuitive thinking is
part of a judge's job description.
Academics are also relatively
20 6
accepting of judicial hunches.
Significant aspects of the American judicial system are
premised on a trial judge's capacity to make all kinds of judgments not
reducible to hard logic. Courts regularly speak of a judge's ability to
evaluate a witness's credibility through observation of his testimony
and demeanor, and it is allegedly for this reason that appellate courts
are so deferential on witness veracity issues. 20 7 There is a widespread

199. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in
JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).
200. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108 (1930), quoted in Kevin W. Saunders,
Realism, Ratiocination,and Rules, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 219, 222-23 (1993).
201. Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 645 (2d Cir. 1943).
202. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion,and "The Progressof the Law", 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 3, 3 (1988).
203. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S.CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1656
(1990).
204. Patricia M. Wald, Thoughts on Decisionmaking, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984)
(discussing judicial decisionmaking process).
205. Judith S. Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection on a
Timeless Concern, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1005, 1009-10, 1015 (1988).
206. See, e.g., Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passionfor Justice, 10 CARDOzO L.
REV. 37, 52-53 (1988); Mark C. Modak-Truran, A PragmaticJustificationof the Judicial Hunch,
35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55, 58 (2001); Saunders, supra note 200, at 221-22; Simon, supra note 198,
at 19; Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch, An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 231, 234-35 (1990).
207. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) ("When findings are
based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater
deference to the trial court's findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in
demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in
what is said.").
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belief among judges that "the trial judge is more likely than an
appellate court to be correct in his judgments about which witnesses
are telling the truth."20 8 This belief in the trial judge's ability to size
up a person's heart and mind by actual observation threads through
the case law in various contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has
approved a trial judge's authority to enhance a defendant's sentence
for lying under oath, emphasizing the judge's ability to see the witness
with her own eyes. According to the Court, the "opportunity to observe
the defendant, particularly if he chose to take the stand in his defense,
can often provide useful insights into an appropriate disposition," and
"the defendant's readiness to lie under oath ...is among the more
precise and concrete of the available indicia" to be used by a judge
when sentencing a defendant. 20 9 Likewise, the Supreme Court has
advised appellate courts to defer to trial courts in a Batson challenge
to a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes, again emphasizing the
trial judge's ability to assess the prosecutor's motives with her own
eyes. As the Court explained, "[T]he decisive question will be whether
[the prosecutor's proffered] race-neutral explanation ... should be
believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue,
and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who
2 10
exercises the challenge."
Deference to trial judges, however, extends beyond a supposed
ability to evaluate a witness's or prosecutor's credibility. In the bail
context, judges claim to draw conclusions based on their face-to-face
study of the defendant's "demeanor." 2 11 And in the sentencing context,
deference to trial judges is premised on, among other factors, a judge's
supposed ability to probe a defendant's soul and determine whether he
is genuinely sorry for the crimes he committed. 21 2 Again, one cannot
but be impressed by the powers claimed by judges in assessing,
through verbal and nonverbal cues, what is occurring inside a
defendant's mind and soul.
208. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 790 (5th ed. 2000).

209. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1978); see also Jeremy A. Blumethal, A
Wipe Of The Hands, A Lick Of The Lips: The Validity Of Demeanor Evidence In Assessing
Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1167-69 (1993).
210. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).
211. Memorandum from the Federal Public Defender, Southern District of Texas to the
Honorable Judge George P. Kazen, United States District Judge, Southern District of Texas 3
(June 1, 1992), quoted in Ronnie Thaxton, Injustice Telecast: The Illegal Use Of Closed-Circuit
Television Arraignments And Bail Bond Hearings In Federal Court, 79 IOWA L. REV 175, 201
n.220 (2004).
212. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-

COLLAR CRIMINALS 115-18 (1988) (recounting interviews with several federal judges who
indicated the importance of remorse and contrition as a sentencing consideration, and not only in
white-collar cases).
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3. Jury
The institution of the American jury unfailingly excites
panegyrics on the intuitive wisdom of the common man. In a recent
book, Randolph Jonakait observes that "[j]urors who are not smart or
educated and can't understand complex issues are able to bring their
life experiences to the task, which often gives them more valuable
knowledge than any judge could have." 2 13 The great thing about
typical jurors, it is said, is precisely that they are not burdened with
postgraduate degrees in logic and that they are free to exercise a
deeper wisdom than that possessed by any philosopher. To be sure, in
theory, jurors follow the law and not their instincts. Judges and
lawyers devote hours to the precise formulation of jury instructions,
the implicit rationale being that jurors should be meticulously guided
by the law, as if they were students of Euclid engaged in the most
rigid of geometric proofs. Minute errors, sometimes amounting to a
single word, 2 14 can provide grounds for reversal, the pretense being
that jurors, though likely less educated than the typical citizen and
often unable even to take notes, are following complex jury
instructions to the letter and applying them with the utmost rigor. In
reality, jurors are to a great degree free to indulge "intuitive notions of
right and wrong."
Jury trials "tolerateo and even encourage[]
decisions made not through the application of logic but through the
21 5
use of common folk wisdom."
In modern times, trial judges are loath even to provide minimal
guidance to juries.
Hence, the once-common practice of judges
commenting on the evidence has fallen out of favor. 2 16 And of course,
on appeal, the greatest deference is enjoyed by jury verdicts, insulated
from assault like impregnable citadels. Along with the trial judge, the
jury is "the primary instrumentality of justice to determine the weight
and credibility to be given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial
forum alone is there human atmosphere and the totality of the
evidence cannot be reproduced with a written record in this Court." 21 7

213. RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM xv (2003). Although Jonakait
concludes that American juries perform "very well," he offers some sensible proposed reforms. Id.
at 279-294.
214. See United States v. Lacy, Nos. 96-4859, 96-4964, 97-4053, 1997 WL 768562, at *1 (4th
Cir. Dec. 15, 1997) (overturning conviction after a four-day trial because the trial judge omitted
one word requested by defense from the jury instructions).
215. Paul Bergman, The War Between the States (of Mind): Oral Versus Textual Reasoning,
40 ARK. L. REV. 505, 509 (1987).
216. Renee Lettow Lerner, The Transformation Of The American Civil Trial: The Silent
Judge, 42 WM & MARY L. REV. 195, 199 (2000) (lamenting this development).
217. Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966).
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The Supreme Court, in a faulty historical reading, 21 8 has infused
policy considerations with constitutional pretensions, announcing that
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment mandates
"compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order
that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy
of belief."21 9 Through cross-examination, famously touted as the
"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,"220
jurors get to study the nonverbal performance of a witness-that is,
"[w]hether the witness fidgets, gesticulates, averts her gaze, whether
her voice cracks, stutters, or rises in pitch, how frequently she pauses
and for how long-all these are demeanor cues. '"221 And supposedly,
such "demeanor evidence" supplies valuable information in evaluating
a witness's credibility: "The Anglo-American trial mode assumes that
accuracy is optimized by having the court or jury hear[] live testimony
2 22
by every witness."
In sum, prosecutors, judges, and juries act upon hunches all
the time, and rather than mocking such hunches as irrational and
capricious, observers traditionally celebrate them as a sort of better
guide than reason. Juries and judges, we are assured, can assess a
witness's credibility from his demeanor-whether he averts his eyes,
rakes his hair, scratches his nose, coughs, stutters, laughs, giggles,
hiccups, blinks, etc. Police officers who mentioned such actions in a
218. In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), Justice Scalia scours English history and
literature to find support for his claim that underlying the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment is the belief that there is informational value in the demeanor of a witness. He
cites, for example, Shakespeare's Richard II, in which Richard demands that two feuding
noblemen be summoned "to our presence-face to face and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will
hear the accuser and accused freely speak." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017 (quoting WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 1, sc. 1). But it does not appear that Shakespeare's account was a
fair depiction of any jurisprudential principles in King Richard's time. Blumethal, supra note
209, at 1184 n.167. Even more problematic for Scalia's use of the play to support his argument,
by the end of the scene, after the two noblemen have personally presented themselves, the King
is nonetheless unable to resolve the dispute, and he orders the two to settle their differences by
trial by battle: so much, it would seem, for the value of demeanor evidence in resolving disputes.
Id. Professor Wellborn notes that Scalia could have cited the example of Sir Walter Raleigh's
demand, during his prosecution for treason, that a witness against him, Lord Cobham,
personally present himself. Yet Raleigh's purpose in demanding that Cobham present himself
was not that he believed that his accuser's demeanor would betray his false testimony, but
rather that Cobham would not give his false testimony if he were forced to do so under oath.
Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1093.
219. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (citation omitted).
220. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974).
221. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure,and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57
STAN. L. REV. 291, 310 (2004) (citation omitted).
222. Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 485, 485
(1999).
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Terry suppression hearing to support a stop would likely receive an illtempered judicial lecture on the difference between rational and
articulable suspicion and the dreaded "mere hunch." But much of the
fact-finding in the American judicial system is predicated, rightly or
wrongly, on reliance on demeanor evidence. One should, thus, unpack
judicial skepticism about a police officer's "mere hunches." It's not
that courts distrust hunches: they just distrust cops.
IV. TOWARDS A REASONABLE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" STANDARD
Judicial hostility to police hunches unquestionably alters the
behavior of police officers in the courtrooms of America, but the extent
to which it meaningfully or beneficially alters their conduct on the
streets of America is another matter. As argued below, the judicial
disparagement of police hunches-although justified as a means of
constraining police-may entail a number of costs. This Part offers
some suggestions as to how the reasonable suspicion judicial standard
might be rendered more reasonable.
For starters, courts could
acknowledge that the evidentiary standard must be calibrated to the
particular circumstance confronted by the police-that is, they should
take into account the gravity of the crime under investigation and the
intrusiveness of the proposed search or seizure. Where police are
searching for a radiological bomb, it would be unreasonable to expect
an identical evidentiary predicate for a stop and frisk as when they
are searching for a gram of cocaine. Likewise, when police haul
someone off the street, detain him for twenty minutes, and perform a
full-body frisk, they must have a more substantial evidentiary
predicate to justify their actions than when, after pulling a car over for
perfectly legitimate reasons, they detain the driver for an additional
ten seconds while they have a drug-sniffing dog circle the car.
Furthermore, the reasonable suspicion standard would be more
reasonable if courts expended less energy in the hopeless task of
distinguishing subjective from objective evidence and more holistically
considered the reasonableness of the entirety of the police officer's
actions, meaning not only the nature of the suspicions that spurred
the police officer to act in the first place, but also the officer's
treatment of the suspect throughout the encounter. If courts reacted
with less instinctive repugnance to a hunch, or anything that seemed
to hint at a hunch, police officers might be more candid about what
they did and why they did it.

2006]

REASONABLE SUSPICIONAND MERE HUNCHES

455

A. The Costs of Excluding Police Hunches
Law has an educative and a morality function; it is neither
simply a set of incentives nor a catalog of prices attached to various
kinds of conduct. Law sends messages, and the message sent by
judicial hostility to police hunches specifically and the reasonable
suspicion case law generally is that police officers do not have
boundless discretion, nor should they think of themselves as having it.
We equip them with badges and armor and pistols, and then we quite
sensibly try to drill into their heads that they are not gods, but public
servants.
How well does this strategy work? Let us consider again the
McKoy case, in which the district court found that the officer's
impressions that the suspect was anxious and had made furtive
gestures did not warrant a frisk, even in a high-crime area. As the
judge wrote, quoting a law review article, "[o]bservations of minimal
significance are sometimes elevated to reasonable suspicion based on
2 23
the character of the neighborhood in which the suspect is found."
The author of that article would presumably agree that a police officer
is entitled to be warier as he approaches a parked car at the
intersection of Maple and Cheney Streets (in downscale Boston) than
at the intersection of Brattle and Sparks Street (in upscale
Cambridge). 22 4 So it is the case, then, that observations that might
not constitute reasonable suspicion in the latter location could be
sufficient in the former.
The district court concluded, however, that the officer's
observations in McKoy were so "minimal" in their probative value that
even in a location where there had been two shootings at security
guards earlier that week, the evidence did not rise to "reasonable
suspicion." If so, what would we want the officers to have done that
afternoon when they saw an illegally parked car and the driver looked
around nervously when he spied the police? Three options present
themselves: (a) stay in the car; (b) call for backup; or (c) approach the
suspect but not frisk him. Option (b) is a non-starter (though a
favorite of law students whenever I pose similar hypotheticals): any
police officer who called in backup when he saw a double-parked car
would be the object of ridicule. Option (c) is problematic. Let's look at
this from the police officer's point of view: "I'm supposed to approach
223. United States v. McKoy, 402 F. Supp. 2d 311, 319 n.ll (D. Mass. 2004) (citations
omitted).
224. Cf. Raymond, supra note 169, at 125 (1999) ("[Iln a purely probabilistic sense, the
character of the neighborhood for criminality may increase the probability that an actor in that
neighborhood is engaged in criminal activity.").
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the car, though the guy looks fishy and seems to be reaching for
something, but I can't frisk him, even though there were two shootings
here a few days ago. If you want me to investigate this guy, I get to
frisk him; otherwise, I stay in the car."
What do we tell this officer? Should he have stayed in his car
or should he have investigated but not frisked? The latter answer is
unrealistic. The police officer is a civil servant, and it is no more
sensible to expect selfless courage from him than it is to expect it of a
city councilman, a judge, or a law professor. If one's answer is that
the officer should have stayed in the car, then perhaps the rule
articulated by Judge Woodlock in McKoy will on the margin contribute
to that result: police officers who were on the fence about doing
nothing or doing something will, with fewer misgivings, just roll on by,
finishing out their shift without breaking a sweat. The question arises
whether this is a victory for civil liberties or a defeat for effective
policing. In any event, most of those police officers who were inclined
to investigate before McKoy will frisk anyhow. Cases such as McKoy
simply ensure that they prepare more diligently for the suppression
hearing, formulating more objective pieces of evidence and adding
details to their "nervousness" and "furtive movements" testimony in
the hopes of satisfying the judge.
Consider the matter from the energetic police officer's
perspective. He sees the double-parked car; he sees the driver's
anxiety and arm movement. The officer decides to investigate. What
has gone through his mind at this point? Probably nothing more than,
"This guy looks fishy." He is more courageous than the typical law
professor or judge, but he is not a fool. He has every intention of
frisking the suspect. It is unlikely that he is worried about case law
such as McKoy. If one could freeze the moment and inquire, he would
assure you that, in the event of a suppression hearing months from
now, there is a capacious menu of "objective" factors from which to
choose. Will they persuade the judge? "Probably," he thinks, "and in
any event, that will be the prosecutor's problem, not mine. The worst
case scenario is the guy goes free. That would be bad, but in the end,
it's not my concern: I live in the suburbs and the kids this guy is
peddling drugs to are no relation to mine." The reality is that cops in
the field have vast discretion-to do something or nothing-and
judicial supervision is so tenuous and temporally distant that it is
unlikely to affect most police officers. The judicial insistence that only
"objective" criteria can form the basis for a Terry stop in practice
simply rewards those officers who are able and willing to spin their
behavior in a way that satisfies judges. It rewards articulate officers
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and penalizes those who are less verbally facile or who are
transparent about their motivations.
Assuming that some segment of police officers behaves
differently as the result of decisions such as McKoy, preferring to coast
through their shift rather than rousting a suspected criminal, the
question remains whether this is a desirable result. Less rousting
means fewer encroachments on civil liberties to be sure but also
More rousting means more constitutional
means more crime.
encroachments on civil liberties and less crime. 225 To state the
obvious: there's a balance that needs to be struck, and it's not entirely
clear why courts, and not elected authorities, should take the lead in
so doing. Some have argued that the political process is so deficient,
so institutionally rigged against certain disfavored communities, that
judicial activism is needed. 2 26 Boston would seem to be a perfect
candidate for such a view, given that of major American cities, its
African-American community is relatively small (25.3% percent of the
city's population). 227 Yet the actual experience does not fulfill the
predictions of the "political process" school. In the late 1980s, Boston
experienced a sharp increase in violent crime, and police adopted an
aggressive stop-and-frisk policy. The policy was referred to within the
police department as "tipping kids upside down" and, arguably, in
practice meant the indiscriminate stopping and frisking of African-

225. The experience in Los Angeles in the late 1990s is illustrative. In the wake of the
Ramparts investigation of the Los Angeles Police Department in the mid-1990s, the LAPD brass,
bowing to political pressure, created multiple layers of bureaucratic oversight and massively
increased penalties for police officers charged with civil rights violations. The number of citizens'
complaints skyrocketed and police altered their behavior, although not in the way that had been
hoped. According to a study by a University of Chicago Business School professor:
Officers used to drive into low-income black and Hispanic neighborhoods and confront
suspects, but now there is a danger that they will face an investigation. The new
strategy of LAPD officers seems to be "drive and wave," whereby officers drive
through low-income black and Hispanic neighborhoods, and instead of getting out of
their car, they keep driving, essentially avoiding doing their jobs ... . After many
years of decline, gang-related violence in Los Angeles increased significantly between
1999 and 2001.
Canice Prendergast, Inefficiency is a Matter of Perspective: The Limits of Bureaucracy, CHICAGO
GSB, Feb. 2005, available at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/news/capideas/feb5/inefficiency.html.
I offer this anecdote not to defend the LAPD's abusive practices in the mid-1990s, but simply to
point out the rousting/crime trade-off.
226. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); see also Michael J.

Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 766 (1991)
("Because the political process does not adequately represent the interests of those societal
groups largely populating the criminal class, political process theory demands judicial
superintendence.").
227. Boston Population and Demographics, http://boston.areaconnect.com/statistics.htm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2006) (relying on 2000 Census Bureau data).
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American youths. 228 Within two years, homicide rates dropped nearly
50 percent, 22 9 and some members of the African-American community
applauded the police for, at long last, taking an interest in minority
neighborhoods. Many others, however, were critical of the police, and
there undoubtedly were a number of "bad seed" police officers who
abused their powers. As the result of political pressure, the police
department abandoned its "tipping kids upside down" policy and
forged instead a "broad alliance between police, social service
230
agencies, and leaders of churches, schools, and community groups."
What is noteworthy about the developments in Boston is that the
political process, not the courts, was responsible for an evolving
understanding of reasonable suspicion, gauged to public perceptions of
an appropriate balancing of the interests at stake.
If such
developments could occur in Boston, with a relatively small minority
population, why are they not equally or even more likely in
communities where minorities have substantial political power? 23 1
Let us stipulate, however, that at times the political process
will fail, and let us further stipulate that as the result of opinions such
as McKoy some police officers will behave differently, by which I mean
more respectfully of civil liberties. Surely one would also have to
concede that the approach to reasonable suspicion articulated in such
an opinion has costs. First, it may make cops more cynical-about
their own jobs, judges, and the law. They learn that the public wants
them to catch criminals and also wants them to be sly when they

228. See Christopher Winship & Jenny Berrien, New Approaches to Fighting Crime: Boston
cops and black churches, 136 PUB. INT. 52, 56 (1999), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_m0377/is_136.
229. Id.
230. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1347 (2001).
231. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1173 (1998) ("[Ilnstead of subjecting all law-enforcement
techniques to searching scrutiny, courts should now ask whether the community itself is sharing
in the burden that a particular law imposes on individual freedom. If it is, the court should
presume that the law does not violate individual rights."); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion
and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 551, 660-61 (1997) ("By openly discussing the formulation of guidelines, police effectively
announce in advance the approach to a problem that the department has tentatively decided to
take. Police can obtain information from neighborhood residents or from advisory councils and
the larger community about the acceptability of the planned approach."); see also Randall
Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law and Racial Discrimination:A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1255, 1255 (1994) ("Like many social ills, crime afflicts African-Americans with a special
vengeance . . . . Many of those who seek to champion the interests of African-Americans,
however, wrongly retard efforts to control criminality."); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE CRIME AND
LAW 19 (1997) ("[T]he principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to criminal
matters is not over-enforcement but under-enforcement of the laws.").
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appear in court. 232 Furthermore, a view of reasonable suspicion that
depreciates the value of hunches increases the costs of policing. To
the extent that some police officers, in obedience to decisions such as
McKoy, meaningfully change their behavior, catching criminals
becomes relatively more difficult.
As the evidentiary predicate
required to stop suspects increases, police officers need to devote
additional resources to catch any one particular criminal; and as
judicial interpretations of "reasonable suspicion" become more
stringent, public funding for police departments soars. Professor
William Stuntz has observed that legislatures have often actively
undercut the effectiveness of judicially created procedural protections
by underfunding criminal defense counsel, increasing sentences for
numerous offenses, and expanding substantive criminal liability. 233
As Stuntz has argued, judicially created criminal procedure rules have
thus driven an ill-advised expansion of the substantive law, which in
turn makes courts more protective of the rights of suspects, and so on
in a vicious cycle. 23 4 One might pursue this line of reasoning another
step: as courts ramp up judicial protections through ever more
stringent interpretations of reasonable suspicion, the politically
accountable branches counter by hiring more police. The number of
police officers across America rose dramatically in the 1980s and
1990s, and as one might expect, the quality of recruits fell. 235
Ironically, if the purpose of stringent "reasonable suspicion" case law
was to rein in police, the case law may have contributed to the
perceived need to expand police forces, diluting quality, and thereby
increasing the rate of police abuses.
B. "ReasonableSuspicion"FirstPrinciples
To the extent that the Supreme Court has, over the years,
attempted to clarify the meaning of "reasonable suspicion," it has done
232. As David Simon has written about the Miranda decision:
[I]t's lawyers, the Great Compromisers of our age, who have struck this bargain, who
still manage to keep cuffs clean in the public courts, where rights and process are
worshipped faithfully .... Trapped in that contradiction, a [police officer] does his job
in the only possible way. He follows the requirements of the law to the letter-or close
enough so as not to jeopardize his case. Just as faithfully, he ignores the law's spirit
and intent. He becomes a salesman, a huckster as thieving and silver-tongued as any
man who ever moved used cars or aluminum siding.
DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 200-01 (1991).

233. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L. J. 1, 7-12, 55-59 (1997).
234. Id.
235. Dave Kopel & Mike Krause, Officer Politics, AMERICAN OUTLOOK, May-June 2001,
available at http://www.americanoutlook.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=article-detail&id=l 120.
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so without recourse to irksome numbers, relying instead on, as
Hamlet said in disgust, "words, words, words." 236 Perhaps, however, it
would be helpful to think about the problem in more quantitative
terms. In the context of the typical investigatory stop, how much
suspicion is needed to qualify as "reasonable?" If we imagine a
spectrum of probability, from a zero percent likelihood of criminal
activity to a one hundred percent certainty, where along the line does
reasonable suspicion fall? Courts have clarified that "probable cause"
is less than the "more probable than not" or "preponderance of the
evidence" standards, 237 which have sensibly been put at roughly 50
percent. 238 Reasonable suspicion is itself a "less demanding standard
than probable cause."239 Indeed, "the likelihood of criminal activity"
that would constitute reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop "falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence
standard."240 Thus, a likelihood of criminal activity perhaps far less
than 50 percent would amount to reasonable suspicion.
This chain of comparisons is, however, not very helpful because
reasonable suspicion cannot plausibly be a fixed standard. If
reasonable suspicion is truly to be reasonable, it must be calibrated to
each specific circumstance. Events during the fall of 2002 in the
Washington, D.C. area confirmed this view. For several weeks, the
area was paralyzed by a series of sniper attacks. 24 1 One or two
witnesses reported a white van near a few of the shootings. 242 After
one murder, police stopped traffic on a major interstate and, with guns
drawn, searched "hundreds of white vans." 243
Obviously, the
likelihood that any single one of the thousands of vans harbored the
sniper was infinitesimal, but the compelling social interest was
244
deemed to justify casting a broad net.
For the time being, let us set aside snipers and bombs and
confine ourselves to the happily more typical case: police officers
searching for drugs or guns. When conducting an investigatory stop
or frisk in such a context, how certain must they be that illegal
236. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
237. See, e.g., United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Probable cause'
is something less than a preponderance.").
238. See, e.g., United States v. Fautico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (surveying ten
district judges who placed the "preponderance of the evidence" standard at a 50-51% certainty).
239. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
240. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).
241. Carol Morello & Josh White, 8th Killing Intensifies Search For Sniper, Pa. Fatherof 6
Slain at Spotsylvania Pump, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2002, at Al.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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activity is afoot? If a police officer stops ten people on a given day and
in one instance his suspicion is borne out-that is, evidence of drugs or
an illegally concealed gun is discovered-would we say that, ex ante,
his actions were reasonable in all ten instances? What if his suspicion
is borne out in two instances or three? Courts have eschewed this sort
of analysis, inquiring not about a police officer's overall success rate
but about the metaphysical nature of the evidence cited in any
individual case to support a stop or frisk: objective evidence is
acceptable, but subjective evidence is not. 245 As I have already argued,
even if one could sort evidence in that way, which is doubtful, 246 it is
unclear that objective evidence is necessarily more indicative of
247
criminal activity.
The weighing of some evidence and the disregarding of other
ultimately rests, at least in part, upon empirical judgments about the
probative value of the evidence. In Florida v. J.L.,248 the police
received an anonymous tip that at a bus station a black youth wearing
a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. 249 The police found such a youth at a
bus station and, upon searching him, found a gun. 250 The Supreme
Court was dismissive of the anonymous tip,251 but why? The opinion
reflected a distaste for anonymous tips, which evoke concerns about
citizens falsely ratting out their enemies simply to harass them. Yet,
the legal system credits anonymous tips if they are richly detailed or
satisfactorily corroborated. 252 The question in J.L. was what probative
value to assign to an anonymous tip that was corroborated in one

245. In isolated contexts, courts have judged law enforcement in part by its ex post success.
See Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1980) (upholding drunk driving checkpoints that had a
1.5% hit rate); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (noting the "effectiveness" of a
border stop, where 171 of 820 stopped vehicles contained illegal aliens). But see City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a roadblock which had
a hit rate of 9%). In the Terry context, however, the judicial analysis is focused on the nature of
the ex ante nature (objective and particularized, or subjective and generalized) of the evidence.
See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[T]he detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.").
246. See supra at Part III.A (noting the difficulty in characterizing certain evidence as
"objective" or "subjective").
247. See supra at Part III.B (arguing subjective hunches may be more probative than certain
pieces of "objective" evidence).
248. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
249. Id. at 268.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 272.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 102-04 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the ways
in which reliance on anonymous tips is appropriate).
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sense-accurate description of present activity-but not another-a
253
prediction of future activity that came to fruition.
One of the curious features of American criminal procedure is
that judges-especially Supreme Court Justices, who live sheltered
and privileged lives, and generally have no practical experience in
policing-are regularly called upon to make empirical judgments for
which their own life experiences leave them wholly unprepared. A
police officer who receives a tip over the telephone presumably makes
an initial judgment about the information. Some tipsters, whose
voices reveal them as children, perhaps playing a prank, are
discounted immediately; other tipsters sound credible enough to pass
on. Of the latter tips, some are quickly revealed as faulty (e.g., there
are no black youths in a bus station where a tipster reported they
would be). So the question is: How reliable are anonymous tips that
pass through some crude filtering? Frankly, I have no idea, and one
can rest assured that neither do U.S. Supreme Court Justices. It
would not be implausible to speculate that one in twenty anonymous
tips, or at least those that pass through some initial screening for
plausibility, are reliable. So one might restate the problem posed by
the J.L. case as whether a 5 percent likelihood of criminal activity is
sufficient reasonable suspicion to merit a stop and frisk. This result in
J.L. is perhaps sensible, given that the suspected offense was merely
possession of a firearm-possibly a serious offense, but not one of
especial gravity. But what if police receive an anonymous tip that a
particular person, of a specific description, is carrying a bomb aboard a
plane? As the Court itself noted in J.L., "We do not say, for example,
that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of
reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm
2 54
before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk."
253. In other words, courts are more likely to credit anonymous tips that correctly predict
future activity (e.g., that someone will get on a plane tomorrow) than anonymous tips that
accurately describe some current activity (e.g., that a person of a particular description is
loitering in a bus station). Compare J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 ("An accurate description of a subject's
readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help
the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however,
does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity."), with Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983) ("[T]he anonymous letter contained a range of details relating
not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future
actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted. The letter writer's accurate information as
to the travel plans of each of the Gateses was of a character likely obtained only from the
Gateses themselves, or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary travel plans.").
254. J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74. As Professor Wayne LaFave has written, "No one would
seriously question the authority of the police to detain for investigation an individual who was
reported by an anonymous informant to be planning to bomb an airplane, and who appears at
the airport carrying a suitcase. Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters & Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 78 (1968); see also Schroeder v. Lufthansa,
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To state the obvious, reasonable suspicion must be reasonable.
As I have previously argued, 255 in trying to imbue some
reasonableness into the law of criminal investigations, one might draw
upon Learned Hand's celebrated formula for evaluating claims of
negligence. 256 A particular stop and frisk would be deemed reasonable
whenever the expected social benefit exceeds the social cost.
Reasonableness would thus be cast roughly as follows:
P(s) x B > C,
where P(s) is the probability of a successful search, B is the social
benefit associated with the prevention or detection of a particular
crime, and C is the social cost (or privacy intrusion) resulting from a
particular kind of search. Of course, not all criminals pose identical
threats to the social order. Accordingly, the evidentiary predicate
needed to stop a suspected serial murderer is far less than what would
be needed to stop a suspected drug mule. Just as all crimes are not
equal, neither are all searches: some involve far more substantial
privacy intrusions than others. Stopping a car at a random checkpoint
for one minute while police ask the driver for identification and a
drug-sniffing dog circles the car is a far lesser privacy intrusion than
pulling a particular car over on the highway and delaying the driver
for twenty minutes.
When courts consider whether police had
reasonable suspicion to make a temporary stop, they should be
sensitive to the gravity of the crime under investigation and the
privacy intrusion resulting from the police activity.
Consider the case of United States v. Davis.257 Someone selling
athletic jerseys was robbed at gunpoint by six young African-American
men who had jumped out of a car. 258 A few minutes later and within
two blocks of the robbery, police pulled over a car meeting the
description given by the victim. 25 9 Two police officers rushed to the
area to investigate whether any other suspects were on foot. 260 One or
875 F.2d 613, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that an airline had sufficient reason to detain a
passenger mid-flight after receiving an anonymous tip that she possessed a bomb).
255. Lerner, The Reasonablenessof Probable Cause, supra note 1, at 1019-21.
256. Hand's formula provides that a party's duty to take precautions to prevent accidents
turns on three variables: (1) the probability of the occurrence of an accident (P); (2) the social loss
caused by the accident (L); and (3) the burden of taking precautions to prevent an accident (B).
When B < P x L, a party is negligent if she fails to take precautions and an accident occurs.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
257. 354 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (M.D. Ala. 2005).
258. Id. at 1272.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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two blocks from the robbery, the officers saw two young AfricanAmerican men in athletic jerseys. Detective Favor testified as follows:
[W]hen I came up on Jackson [street], I could see where Sergeant Loria had the vehicle
stopped. When I made the left [turn] and started down High Street, I could see these
two gentlemen walking right in front of the Chevron station. That's why I stopped
them. They were in the area. They were two black males fitting the description wearing
jerseys, and I was simply checking them out. I didn't-there's no need-I wasn't
jumping out, throwing them on the car and arresting them or anything like that. It was
simple-I just-you know, it would be-it would be dereliction of my duty if I did not
stop them and see if these were possibly suspects. I was polite to them, they were polite
26 1
to us, and everything went well.

When asked why he had suspected the pair might have been involved
in the robbery, Detective Favor responded:
Only my prior experience with pulling over vehicles, prior experience with-I had six
subjects rob somebody. We had a suspect vehicle parked. One person is in that vehicle.
Other people went somewhere if that is in fact the correct vehicle. I don't-it's a time
frame here where you don't have time to wait [sic]. You know, five, ten minutes, 20
minutes for all that information to get out on the radio. The problem is, at this point,
they've got a suspect vehicle stopped; I've got young men fitting the physical description
wearing jerseys; jerseys were stolen. I stopped those young men to find out whether or
not they had any involvement in it. Like I say, everybody was polite. They went back
262
with us afterwards, and I turned the younger one over to his mother.

It is worth emphasizing how candid Detective Favor was in
describing the encounter, never gilding the lily with observations of
suspicious behavior, "furtive" movements, or "bulges." Rather, he
commended the suspects for behaving "very well. '263 It turned out
neither had anything to do with the reported robbery, but a frisk of
one of the young men uncovered a gun and drugs. 264 Charged with
illegal possession, his lawyer moved to suppress the evidence as the
fruit of an illegal stop. 265 In granting the motion, the district court
emphasized how little evidence there was to support the stop: the
neighborhood was predominantly African-American so there was
nothing unusual about African-American men walking in the
neighborhood. 266 There was no evidence that the criminals had put on
the jerseys. 267 Furthermore, the officer did not testify that the suspects
were loitering, walking quickly, or in any way acting out of the
ordinary. 268 The court wrote, "While this court can appreciate this

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1273.
at 1275.
at 1273.
at
at
at
at
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1275-77.
1276.
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officer's experience in detecting criminal activity and his usual
investigative practice, it remains mindful that 'if undue reliance is
placed upon an agent's "perception" or "interpretation" of observed
conduct, then the requirement of specific, objective facts may be easily
circumvented."' 26 9 Nowhere did the court acknowledge that police
were investigating a serious crime (armed robbery) or that the police
had conducted the most minimally intrusive search to determine
whether the suspects were involved in the robbery.
The judicial power to regulate the police arises for the most
part from a phrase in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
(and, in the case of state courts, almost identical provisions in the
state constitutions). In relevant respect, the Constitution provides
that the people are to be secure from "unreasonable searches and
seizures." 270 One might think that in judging whether a search or
seizure is reasonable, there are many things to be considered: What
made the police suspicious in the first place? What time constraints
did the police face? How serious was the crime under investigation?
How intrusive was the search or seizure? How did the police behave
during the encounter? How did the police behave after the encounter?
Yet as we see in Davis, courts often focus exclusively on what police
knew (or said they knew) before the stop. And with respect to such
evidence, they narrow their gaze to those "objective" facts the police
officer can manufacture months after the incident in a suppression
hearing. The fact that police were investigating a serious crime such
as armed robbery? Irrelevant. The fact that police needed to act
quickly if they were going to solve the crime? Irrelevant. The fact
that police adopted the least intrusive means to determine whether
the suspects were involved in the crime? Irrelevant. The fact that the
police acted politely during the search? Irrelevant. The fact that the
police acted in commendable fashion after the search (returning one
youth to his mother)? Irrelevant. Detective Favor, who thought it
would be a "dereliction of [his] duty" if he had not stopped the two
men, is informed by the district court that he could not be more wrong
about what his duties entail. Far from having a duty to stop the two
suspects, he had a constitutional duty not to stop them, a duty that he
had violated, and which at least in theory could form the basis of a
civil suit against him. In the future, we may assume that Detective
Favor will either not bother stopping suspects in similar

269. Id.
270. Of course, the Fourth Amendment provides also that warrants shall issue only upon
probable cause, but we are here dealing with contexts in which police can act without first
obtaining a warrant. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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circumstances, or he will embellish his testimony with the sort of
objective details that the district court lamented were lacking.
C. Taking Hunches Seriously
Another important way that courts could enhance the
reasonableness of reasonable suspicion is by abandoning the
distinction between "objective" and "subjective" evidence and by giving
police hunches their due. Especially in light of recent advances in the
cognitive sciences, Chief Justice Warren's disparaging remarks in
Terry about "inchoate" and "inarticulable" evidence are ripe for
reconsideration. 271 Just because police officers fail to frame their
words in the approved language of the courts, or are unable to express
themselves with the glibness of a skilled litigator, does not mean that
they acted unreasonably given the factual situation they faced. If an
experienced police officer has a mere hunch that a person boarding a
plane is carrying a bomb, his hunch might warrant a detention of a
minute or so to make inquiries. Likewise, if the officer suspects the
person is about to reach for a gun, it may be reasonable for the officer
to order the suspect to remove his hands slowly from his pockets. After
all, the intrusion is small and the social harm that would result from a
failure to stop the particular crime is great.
The lingering and unanswered question is the accuracy of all
those hunches police officers claim to have. There are some cases in
which erroneous hunches form the basis of a civil suit against an
officer, but far more commonly police hunches arise during
suppression motions in a criminal trial in which the police officer's
hunch has been borne out. Of course, there is a selection problem:
courts never learn of most erroneous police hunches because the
victims do not bother to file suit. The question, then, when reading in
a judicial opinion about a successful police hunch is whether the case
is typical or atypical for the officer.
Consider United States v.
Foreman,272 in which an officer parked himself on a road allegedly
renowned as a drug trafficker's corridor and saw a driver who struck
him as suspicious. What was it about the driver? Trooper Wade
mumbled something at a suppression hearing about the suspect's
"tense posture" and the fact that he was "staring straight ahead" (as
opposed to admiring the scenery, presumably). 273 Wade pulled the
driver over on the pretext that he was speeding and while issuing a

271. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 27 (1968).
272. 369 F.3d 776, (4th Cir. 2004).
273. Id. at 778.

2006]

REASONABLE SUSPICIONAND MERE HUNCHES

467

citation, peppered him with questions, getting inconsistent answers
while the suspect perspired away. 274 After issuing the citation, the
trooper detained the suspect for an additional minute while a drugsniffing dog circled the car and alerted for the presence of drugs. 275 A
split panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed a trial court's decision to
suppress the evidence, laboring to total up the objective evidence
(which included a car freshener!). 276 This story is susceptible to two
explanations-first, that Trooper Wade is a marvel at detecting
criminals and second, that he was pulling over all African-American
males that morning and happened to hit pay dirt with Mr. Foreman.
Why don't we find out? If Trooper Wade's incident reports for that
week, confirmed by the video camera with which his cruiser was
equipped, indicate that he pulled over ten people and eight of the ten
proved to be drug traffickers, surely this sheds light on the question of
277
whether he acted reasonably.
What I am suggesting is that judges show a little humility
when called upon to second-guess police officers, who do not have the
luxury of evaluating the data before them as an appellate judge does.
This is not really such a novel suggestion. The Supreme Court itself
suggested as much in United States v. Cortez, cautioning its judicial
charges to be somewhat deferential to the police officer:
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the
law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
commonsense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to
do the same-and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected
must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as
278
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.

In the last sentence quoted above, the Court acknowledges that
scholars (and judges?) may "see and weigh" evidence differently than
police officers. In some cases, the Court makes this point precisely to
denigrate the perspective of the police officer, who, "engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," sees the world
through glasses clouded by zeal and who must be reined in by a
"neutral and detached magistrate. '279 But here in Cortez, the Court
274. Id. at 778-79.
275. Id. at 778-80.
276. Id. at 778.
277. In theory, at least, Wade might be both a detecting marvel and a racist, in the sense
that he saw thirty persons he knew to be drug traffickers, twenty white and ten AfricanAmerican, but he let the white ones pass and stopped only the African-Americans. I postpone the
question of racial profiling to the conclusion of this Article.
278. 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
279. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("Any assumption that evidence
sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will
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suggests a deficiency in the scholar's and magistrate's viewpoint.
"Those versed in the field of law enforcement" apparently have access
to information denied to those of us (scholars, judges) in cloistered
28 0
libraries.
In practice, this would mean shying away from the second-bysecond analyses of police actions that are commonplace in judicial
opinions. Should we really care whether a police officer sees a furtive
gesture five seconds before or five seconds after ordering a suspect out
of a car? 281 Does it really matter if a police officer, during a car stop,
questioned one passenger at 4:17 and another at 4:20?282 The more
fundamental questions would be: Is this a good police officer? Did he
treat the suspect with respect throughout the encounter? Given the
officer's stated reasons for stopping or frisking the suspect, was the
intrusion upon the suspect reasonable? Did the officer work as
quickly as possible to determine whether or not there were grounds to
detain the suspect longer? It is at this relatively higher level of
supervision that courts would be well-advised to remain.
Furthermore, courts should never forget that police officers live
in a world where threats are often real. Consider Upshur v. United
States,28 3 in which two police officers in a high-crime area witnessed a
hand-to-hand transaction between two men, one of whom sped off in a
car, nearly hitting the police officers. 28 4 As the officers approached the
remaining man, he balled up his hands into fists. 28 5 One of the officers
grabbed his hands, forcibly opened them, and drugs fell out. 28 6 The
court suppressed the drugs, finding that police lacked reasonable
suspicion to order the suspect to open his hands. 28 7 First of all, the
court failed to acknowledge how infinitesimal the privacy intrusion in
question was. Even more remarkably, the court never contemplated
that a fist is itself a weapon.

justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a
nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.").
280. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
281. See, e.g., United States v. McKoy, 402 F. Supp. 2d 311, 312-13, 312 n.1, and 312 n.2 (D.
Mass. 2004).
282. In United States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490, 49-97 (5th Cir. 2003), a panel of the Fifth
Circuit created a minute-by-minute timeline, from 4:13 to 4:43, in an opinion suppressing
evidence obtained during a car stop. The Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc and reversed the
panel. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
283. 716 A.2d 981 (D.C. 1998).
284. Id. at 982, 985-86.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 984-86.
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Abandoning the impracticable distinction between objective
and subjective evidence would have at least one certain benefit:
promoting police candor. When asked as to why he frisked someone,
the officer might say:
Things didn't look right to me. He seemed to be reaching for something and there had
been a lot of crimes in the area during the past month. It was dark and frankly I was
scared. I was concerned the guy might have a gun. I was polite the whole time; I didn't
throw him to the ground; I tried to check the information as quickly as I could. I want to
do my job and I want to be a good citizen. Check my record-I do a good job in catching
criminals

Instead we hear:
I saw an illegally double-parked car in a high-crime area. The fellow made a furtive
gesture as I approached. I noticed a car freshener in the car. There was a pager in the
car. The car was registered to a person who lives in a neighborhood known for drug
trafficking. The suspect seemed very nervous.

The police officer will offer either statement at a suppression
hearing. The question is which makes us feel better about ourselves
as a society. As David Simon suggests with respect to the Miranda
decision, certain criminal procedure rules are mostly about a society's
self-image and only incidentally about checking police abuses. 28 8 Why
it pleases some to have police officers parrot back slogans from
previous judicial opinions is not entirely clear to me; and those who
enthusiastically support the current regime would need to
acknowledge its costs, already summarized above, which doubtless
include the breeding of cynicism among police officers.
There will always be rotten cops, and unlike rotten law
professors, bad cops can do a great deal of harm. 28 9 Of course, there
are also dozens of bad judges in America, 290 which is neither an
argument for abolishing the judiciary nor for the creation of an
entirely new institution devoted to the regulation of the courts. The
best solution to the problem of bad judges is transparency and
meaningful self-regulation, and likewise with bad cops. Should police
be able act upon their mere hunches, insofar as those hunches reflect
the accumulated wisdom of years of policing? To some degree, my
suggestion is yes. If the privacy intrusion is negligible or the gravity
of the suspected offense very high, perhaps a mere hunch alone might
justify action. Furthermore, if the officer had a hunch and there was
other evidence consistent with criminal activity, perhaps it would be
reasonable to allow the police to take some action. Such a rule does
not mean letting police run wild.
Transparency and internal

288. SIMON, supra note 232, at 192-201.
289. This fact gives me great comfort.
290. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431 (2004).
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accountability, rather than judicial supervision should provide the
most meaningful assurances against police overreaching.
With
respect to transparency, one of the most notable developments in
policing over the past decade has been the increasingly routine use of
video cameras in police cruisers. 291 Although not without their
limitations (stationary cameras have a limited viewing area) and
drawbacks (some officers complain that they are a distraction), this
equipment has many salutary effects. 292 Police officers, aware that
their actions are being recorded, are obviously more likely to be on
their best behavior. 293 And the public, which now has more
information about what police officers actually do can invest greater
confidence in them. 294
D. Racial Profiling
At long last, I need to address a problem skirted at various
points during the Article without ever being squarely addressed: racial
profiling. Early on, I assumed that Officer McFadden, the officer who
nabbed Terry and his two criminal associates, was a good cop. 295 But
what if, instead, he had made a practice of following and harassing
African-Americans? Likewise, I provisionally applauded Officer Wade
in Foreman for having a hunch about a drug dealer that proved
accurate. 296 But perhaps Wade pulled over any young AfricanAmerican man who struck his fancy. If one urges judicial deference to
police officers' hunches, in practice will this condone racial
discrimination in policing? Whereas irrational racism and stereotypes
are often penalized in a market setting, 297 state actors can indulge in
racial prejudices and are largely insulated from the costs of their
errors. As Professor Nelson Lund writes, "When governments
discriminate ... the costs and benefits are entirely political-not
economic. Governments do not go out of business, no matter how
inefficient they are, and they do not respond to economic incentives

291. Lonnie J. Westphal, The In-Car Camera: Value and Impact, POLICEONE.COM, Nov. 10,
2004, available at http://www.policeone.com/police-products/vehicle-equipment/in-car-video/
articles/93475/.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
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except when economic forces and political forces are aligned in the
298
same direction."
The search for the snipers in the Washington, D.C., area
during the fall of 2002 illustrates governmental ineptitude in racial
profiling. For reasons that were never clear-although incompetent
processing of witness statements and bogus psychological profiles
were likely candidates-the police forces in the area were convinced
that the suspect was a "lone white male."299 Vast energies were
focused in this direction; and then it turned out that the crimes had
been committed by a pair of African-American men. 300 It would seem
to have been a case of politically correct racial profiling. This is not
the first time the government has rounded up suspects based on
dubious racial stereotypes (consider the internment of Japanese
30 1
Americans during World War II) and it likely will not be the last.
The $64,000 question is: What should be done to prevent government
employees from engaging in improper racial profiling? Like Lund, I
confess that I am not sure what the answer is.302 The nub of the
problem is that individuals do and will prejudge people according to
age, sex, and race, and it is not entirely clear that we want police
officers to ignore such data, even if we could effectively monitor and
punish such behavior.
Consider a police officer driving down a street with two seconds
of eyeball time to allocate. On one side of the street are three elderly
women; on the other side are three young men. What should he do?
Should he swivel from one side of the street to the other, devoting one
second to each? Should he mentally flip a coin and then accord either
side his full attention? Or should he look straight ahead thereby
ensuring that there cannot be the slightest accusation of sex and age
discrimination? The young men are of course almost surely doing
nothing wrong, but the question is the differential likelihood of
criminal activity. That being said, it is possible that police officers
overstate the significance of gender, age, ethnic, and racial data; and,
unlike private actors, there is no possibility of market correction. In
other words, an employer who irrationally discriminates against
African-Americans, for example, decreases the available labor pool
and increases labor costs. A police officer who devotes all or most of
his attention to African-American men may be a less effective cop as
298. Nelson Lund, The Conservative Case Against Racial Profiling in the War on Terrorism,
66 ALB. L. REV. 329, 335 (2003).
299. Id. at 340-41.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 341.
302. Id. at 342.
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measured by his number of arrests; but it is unclear whether he
personally will pay any price, and it is certain that the police force, as
an entity composed of such employees, is in no danger of going out of
business.
There is some, 30 3 albeit challenged,3 0 4 evidence that police
forces have been guilty of improper racial profiling. Assuming that
there really is improper racial profiling and one's only goal were to
abolish it, one could implement police guidelines requiring officers to
tabulate racial data on every person whom they investigated, followed,
stopped, and frisked. Then, one could require comparisons of this data
to the racial breakdown in the population at large. In the event of any
departure along any matrix, the individual officer would bear the
burden of proving to his superior that he did not behave improperly, or
he would face demotion, suspension, and discharge. The superior
would then have the burden of proving to a court that the officer did
not behave improperly or face personal and institutional liability.
Such a proposal would surely diminish improper racial profiling, but it
would be certain also to decrease policing effectiveness. Thousands of
police officers would become bureaucrats, and those poor souls left
behind on the streets would be more determined to avoid the wrath of
the bean counters than to catch criminals.
V. CONCLUSION

Police officers are, or should be, in the business of policing. To
do this difficult job well, police officers, just like judges and
prosecutors, need a realm of freedom in which to act, and to some
degree this means a freedom to act upon their hunches. Police
officers, even more than judges and prosecutors, must be able to act
quickly, without access to all relevant information, and frequently
they must tap into an experiential wisdom that may not be conveyable
in terms that satisfy a learned jurist. But contra Chief Justice
Warren, the fact that a police officer cannot glibly articulate his
suspicions does not mean that these suspicions are not reasonable.
We all agree that the police should track down criminals while
respecting the rights of innocents. Making this happen depends on
countless variables, such as: the quality of police recruits, the nature

303. See, e.g., David Cole, The Color of Justice: Courts are Protecting,Rather than Helping to
End, Racial Profiling by Police, THE NATION, Oct. 11, 1999; DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE
BLACK: RACIAL
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HIGHWAY (1999),

available at http://www.

aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html.
304. See Heather Macdonald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, 11 City J. 14, 14 (2001), available
at http://www.city-journal.org/htmll 1-2_the-myth.html.
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of their training, the competence of the police command structure, the
supervision of the police by politically accountable authorities, and
finally, judicial supervision of the police. Legal elites are prone to
focus on the last margin almost to the exclusion of all others, although
it is probable that it is among the least significant factors in the mix.
Thanks to the incorporation of the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure
protections, 30 5 police forces around the country are governed by almost
identical legal rules, but some thrive and others flounder. Perhaps a
portion of the vast resources (mental and monetary) frittered away
constructing perfect models of judicial supervision of the police might
be better invested in attracting top-notch recruits and promoting the
30 6
most promising among those to positions of authority.
The basic argument for stringent judicial supervision is that no
police officer-and really no one-can be trusted. This is an excellent
political principle. The problem is that some people have to be trusted
to some degree, and a few even trusted to a great degree to have a free
country, so education in the use of power is needed, rather
than quixotic attempts to eliminate all risks attendant to the bestowal
of power. What this means is simple: Be selective about who becomes
police officers; train them well; install diligent supervisors; make the
supervisors accountable to politicians; and compel the politicians to
answer to the people. There is a role for courts in regulating police
conduct as well, but it is not as enthusiastic as current practice
assumes. The American criminal justice system is bizarrely more
focused on the regulation of police conduct (during searches and
seizures and in the interrogation room) than it is on the accurate
sorting of the innocent and the guilty. One would think it is in the
latter role that courts would have a comparative advantage, rather
than as meta-supervisors of the police forces of America.

305. A development lamented notably by Professor Donald Dripps, in part because it has
removed any jurisdictional competition between state and federal law enforcement authorities.
Donald A Dripps, On the Costs of Uniformity and the Prospects of Dualism in Constitutional
CriminalProcedure,45 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 433, 437-38 (2001).
306. In Kopel & Krause, supra note 235, the authors discuss the scandals in several police
departments in the 1990s. The authors suggest that part of the blame may be placed on the 1994
federal crime law, which allowed and even required localities to hire many more police officers.
See id. ("President Clinton's 1994 legislation... [to] put a hundred thousand more police officers
on the street could accurately be described as a plan to give deadly weapons and life-or-death
power to a hundred thousand people who did not meet the standards to be hired as police officers
in 1993.").

